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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
Voting is one of the ways in which the public participates in the. 
political process. It is the final stage in the proc~ss of paying atten-
tion to politics -- reading, talking, thinking -- and a recurrent and 
periodic event in the life of individuals and social groups. Moreover, 
if democracy could be simply and realistically defined as a regime in 
which those who govern are chosen by those who are governed by means of 
free and open elections, then a collective vote decision is of great 
significance in any democratic political system. The importance of 
elections in a democratic government may be elaborated in terms of 
decision-making. Decisions of the electoral process have important 
effects on decisions taken elsewhere in the system, What the electorate 
decides may determine which actors will have the power of decision, and 
the outcome of past and future elections generate important influences 
1 to which these actors respond. 
The decision who shall control the executive power of the state is 
of great consequence in every political system. Certainly few decisions 
1Angus Campbell, Philip Eo Converse, 
E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: 
1960), p, 5-. -
1 
Warren E. Miller, and Donald 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
2 
rival in importance the choice of a President when the power to make the 
decision is vested in a mass electorate. The American system has always 
followed this practiceo In France, since the modification of the Cons-
titution by the referendum of 1962, the President of .the Republic is 
elected by direct popular vote. In casting their votes in a Presiden-
tial contest, individuals act toward a world of politics in which they 
perceive the parties, personalities, issues and other groupings. The 
voters' attitudes, like other human attitudes are not self-generating, 
but are formed by inter-actions between the voters' psycho-physical 
make-up and their physical and social environment. 
Psychological, physical, sociological, political variables deter-
mine the attitudes of individuals in any presidential situation. Psy-
chological variables intervene between the external events of the voter's 
world and his ultimate behavior: for instance, the personal experience 
the voter has concerning the relation of authority in his contacts with 
others, and.his personal knowledge of the various issues of political 
life, of the values at stake in the government of men. The act of 
voting is not an end in itselfo It is rather a choice of means toward 
other ends. These ends may concern facts of human life that are at core 
non-political, and these facts turn one's attention to the non-political 
sources of the voters' decision. Physical characteristics such as age, 
race and sex, also exercise an influence on the formation of political 
behavior which cannot be denied. Sociological experiences of indivi-
duals involving group behavior in the family, social class, and church, 
socio-economic interests, income, profession and residence; in short; 
the social organization of the environment have an impact on voters' 
decisions at the pollso 
3 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to test the significance of a number 
of factors or variables which are assumed to influence the voting be-
havior of people in France and in the United States in their choice of 
presidential candidates. Because of the difficulty of gathering psycho-
logical indicators for such a study, a number of related political and 
sociological variables have been selected as follows: 
1. Party and group articulation 
2. Issues and personality of candidates 
3. Ideologies 
4. Sectionalism and legal-political institutions 
Such questions will be investigated as the relationship between 
individual attachment to parties and membership in various groups and 
social aggregates, and voting in political elections; the relationship 
between socio-economic status, religio-ethnic background, age, occupa-
tional status and voting behavior; and the significance of specific is-
sues and the personality of candidates on voters' choice of candidates. 
The significance of ideologies, including religion, as well as the in-
fluence of regional characteristics and traditions and the institutional 
arrangements, will also be tested to discover whether these have a mea-
surable relationship to voting behavior. 
Using the presidential elections of 1960 in the United States and 
1965 in France as case studies, the relative significance of each of the 
variables will be examined to determine its relationship to the pattern 
of voting behavioro Similarities arid dissimilarities betweeri the Ameri-
can and French political systems may aid in formulatihg certain 
4 
generalizations concerning the relative importance of these variables in 
the process of political socialization and articulation of electorates 
in democratic political systemso 
Review of Literature 
Concerning the United States, any survey of the literature on 
voting behavior is difficult and cannot help but be superficial, since 
the subject of voting behavior has produced a prodigious number of 
studies. 
Empirical social research has moved from a concern for the demo-
graphic aspects of social phenomena to the socio-psychological aspects 
and, finally, to concern with the systemic aspects of human behavior. 
American studies have made the fullest use of the techniques of des-
criptive statistics and have concentrated mainly upon ethnic, social, 
legal and economic factors as explanatory devices. 
Analyses of voting statistics have tended to focus on the political 
2 3 
meaning of voting behavior. The works of V. O. Key, H. F. Gosnell, 
and Stuart Rice4 are illustrativeo After public opinion polls and aca-
demic survey organizations became highly developed, it was possible to 
go more deeply into the socio-psychological aspects of voting behavior. 
2 V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 1949). 
3H. F. Gosnell, Getting out the Vote (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, (1927), and Machine Politics: Chicago Style, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1927). 
4 Stuart Rice, Farmers and Workers in American Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1924). 
5 The pioneering works of Lazarsfeld and the Bureau of Applied Social 
Research at Columbia, in their studies of voting behavior, followed by 
6 the output of the Survey Research Center, are primary examples. 
In The Voter Decides, the authors were concerned with an analysis 
of various attitudinal factors, with emphasis on psychology.and the 
individual's basic make-up. Party identification and perception of 
issues and candidates were seen as highly important in motivating the. 
individual's voting behavior. 
The most comprehensive example of election research was reported 
in The American Voter, which attempted to explain why Americans have 
5 
voted as they did in national elections since 1948. By the use of sur-
vey techniques, the authors of the study identified and measured various 
factors influencing voting. Although thoroughly socio-psychological and 
theoretical, the study took cognizance of the many social and regional 
variables surrounding the voting decision. Voting was regarded as an 
act following a sequence of events, using the "funnel of causality11 as 
a metaphor. Personal subjective factors of which the person was aware 
and external objective conditions of which he was not aware were placed 
in the funnel and related to political and non-political conditions. 
5 Paul E. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The Peo-
ple's Choice(New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) Bernard Berel-
son, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1954). 
6 Angus Campbell and Robert Lo Kahn, The People Elect~ President, 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center Series No. 
1952). Angus Campbell, Gerald, Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter 
Decides (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954): and Angus 
Campbell, Phili.p E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, 
The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960). 
6 
In recent years attempts have been made to view the electoral pro-
cess from a systemic point of reference, This point of reference con-
siders the electorate in relation to political parties and candidates as 
constituting a system of interrelated partso One can cite Katz and El-
dersveld7 in their study of presidential campaigns in Detroito The em-
phasis on the individual as a unit of political analysis has also stimu-
lated empirical research on the relations between personality and poli-
tical attitudes and behavior, as well as on the processes by which indi-
viduals are prepared for political roles. 
In France, the pioneer book in the field of voting behavior was 
Andre Siegfried's Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest Sous la III 
Republique8 published in 1913. Subsequent investigations have been 
9 10 
carried out by Francois Goguel and George Dupeux, sponsored by the 
Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. These studies used the 
electoral geography approacho The social composition of the electorates 
was correlated in each region with the expressed political attitudes of 
the voters. 
7Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, 11The Impact of Local Party 
Activity Upon the Electorate, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961), 
pp. 1-24. 
8Andre Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest Sous 
la III Republique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1913). 
9 Francois Goguel, 11Nouvelles Etudes de Sociologie Electorale, 11 
Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 60 (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1954). 11 Geographie des Elections Francaises de 1870 a 
1951,11 Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 27 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1951). 
lOGeorge Dupeux and Francois Goguel, 11Sociologie Electorale; Es-
quisse d'un Bilan, 11 Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Poli-
ques, .26 (Paris: Armand Colin,1951) o 
7 
Siegfried distinguished in the apparent confusion of French politi-
cal life the persistence of two profound ideological tendencies -- the 
Right and the Left. This division of the French public into two funda-
mental ideological orientations was further developed by F. Goguel, who 
substituted for the terms "Left and Right" the expression "Party of 
Movement" and "Party of Established Order." Subsequent research into 
French electoral sociology has been pursued in terms of this ideological 
division. The postulate that all political tendencies can be reduced to 
the antitheses of Right and Left or Movement and Order has rarely been 
questioned in France. 
Method and Procedure 
This thesis is concerned with the major variables which influence 
the voters in the United States and in France in their choice of presi-
dential candidates. Several hypotheses have been formulated to guide 
the investigation. 
It is hypothesised that in France the voters' preferences for 
President are not highly related to their sense of party attachment, 
while in the United States party identification is a most significant 
factor in the outcome of presidential elections. 
With respect to interest groups, voting studies suggest that in 
the United States, where membership in interest groups is high and where 
pressure groups participate actively in the campaign, there is a high 
correlation between voting behavior and membership in one of the nation-
wide interest groupingso In France the influence of interest groups is 
far less significant on the outcome of elections. Significant corre-
lations between such social categories as class, education, age, and 
voting behavior are expected to be found in both countries. 
Another hypothesis is that issues and proposed solutions by the 
candidates in the American and in the French environments do not have 
an important bearing upon the voters 1 preference as between the candi-
dates. 
8 
Personal characteristics and achievements of the candidates are 
presumed to be a major factor in the presidential elections of both 
countries, despite the fact that in the United States the candidates 
are nomine:es of the parties and must support the party platform and 
espouse the partisan interests which support the party. In France a 
most significant appeal has been the charisma of the candidate, the man 
who stands above party and who most personifies the national heritage. 
In most countries we expect that competition in terms of partisan 
ideologies will appear. In France, two principal ideological currents 
used to divide public opinion: the right-wing ideology of the authori-
tarian regime supported by a state religion and the maintenance of a 
class structured society based upon the unequal division of property 
values; and leftism, which would substitute a new society for the 
existing order, with emphasis upon socialism, equality, and anti-
clericalism. Although these traditional cleavages dividing Right and 
Left have declined, it is hypothesized that ideologies have a strong 
bearing upon the French voters' choice in a presidential election. In 
the United States, where the ideology of democracy tends to unite Ameri-
cans, since both parties agree on the fundamental values and rules of 
the society, the ideological impact is far less significant. 
It is hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between 
electoral choice and religious affiliation in both countries. In the 
9 
United States the religious factor was important in the 1960 election, 
while in France attachment to Catholicism has generally corresponded to 
conservative attitudes and religious indifference has characterized 
the leftist vote. 
In both countries presidential elections are expected to be in-
fluenced a great deal by regional characteristics and traditions. In 
France there exists a close link between the traditional Right- Left 
cleavage and regionalism, which causes a majority of voters in the geo-
graphic Center, the South .. West and South-East to vote for leftist cc:i.n-
didates, while the pattern of voting in the Northwest and the Northeast 
is conservative. In the United States politics has often been described 
as a conflict between different sections or regions in which strong 
party attachments constituted a stable force in American politics. 
After the Civil War the Republicans were the dominant party in the North 
and the Democrats the party of the South. Republicanis~ has continued 
to prevai1:_!~ the great farm belt iIJ- the Midwest, while the Democrats 
have become the dominant party of the urban centers of America. 
Election behavior must also be studied in the context of the insti-
tutional setting of the national st~te. France is a unitary state, 
while the United States is a federation of states. The Uniteq. States 
has a presidential government, which draws a clear distinction ·petween 
the executive and legislative branches of the political syst!=ll'll•, France 
has a presidential - parliamentary form of government, where the execu-
tive power is shared by the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister, and the gover~ment is responsible before the Parliament, 
In the American two-party system, the voters are confronted with 
only two rival candidates for legislative offices, whereas Fr~nce µas a 
10 
complex multiparty system. The electoral systems are different as well 
as the campaigning processes. It is assumed that the different legal-
political institutions will have a significant influence on the voters' 
attitudes. 
Source Material 
The presidential election of 1960 in the United States and of 1965 
in France will serve as case studies for this thesis in order to evalu-
ate the relative importance of the variables examined. Aggregate data, 
particularly election returns and census reports, which are useful in 
describing recurring patterns of voters' preferences and the character-
istics of particular electorates will be analysed. Data secured from 
questionnaires and interviews by researchers in the United States and 
in France, public opinion surveys and articles, provided by newspapers 
and periodicals, will provide the bulk of the empirical evidence to 
test the hypotheses. A quantitative measurement of the data will be 
used as far as possible in evaluating the significance of each variable. 
The second chapter will evaluate the impact of party identifica-
tion and interest group membership in American and French presidential 
elections. The third chapter will consider the role of issues and 
personalities of the candidate on the outcome of these elections. The 
fourth chapter will examine the impact of ideologies and religion, while 
the fifth chapter will analyse the sectional and institutional variableso 
The sixth chapter will provide a set of conclusions to the hypotheses 
and a summation of the thesis in terms of the similarities and dis-
similarities discovered in the measurement of the different variables 
in the two countries. Generalizations concerning the implications of 
11 
voting behavior in presidential elections on the party system of demo-
cratic societies will be made. 
CHAPTER II 
THE IMPACT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
ON VOTERS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 
Party Affiliation 
In every modern democracy conflict among different groups is ex-
pressed through political parties. Parties are the only forces whose 
purpose is to exercise an influence upon political organs not only occa-
sionally but permanently and to concentrate their efforts upon political 
elections and the espousal of programs of political actions. Unlike a 
labor.union or a professional society parties are political groups con-
cerned with winning power. The influence·of parties as determinants\of 
voting behavior in a presidential election might be expected to be prom-
inent in any political system" 
Party affiliation refers to the diffuse commitment to one or 
another party in political life. It is the base from which political 
parties mobilize electoral support. It is a measure which varies 
slowly and persists between elections. The identification does not 
necessarily denote a voting record. 
In the United States millions of people may attach or tie them-
selves to the Republican or Democratic party without necessarily regis-
tering as such, voters are to some extent attached to a party. They 
12 
13 
acquire their party identification very early in life. 1 Party iden-
tification is fairly constant in the American electorate. 
The Survey Research Center, using a national sample of 1,139 to 
1,772 persons from the period 1952 to 1962, found that there was a high 
degree of consistency in party identification over the period; that the 
respondents were willing to identify themselves to some degree as Demo-
crats or Republicans; that Democrats (independent, weak and strong) out-
numbered Republicans by a percentage averaging from 54 to 31. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1952-1962 2 
Identification 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 
Strong Democrat 22% 22% 21% 23% 21% 23% 
Weak Democrat 25 25 23 25 23 22 
Independent Democrat 10 9 7 7 8 7 
Independent 5 7 9 8 8 8 
Independent Republican 7 6 8 4 7 6 
Weak Republican ,14 14 14 16 13 16 
Strong Republican · · · 13 · · 13 · · · 15 13 14 12 
Total .100% ... 100% . . . . 100% .100% 100% 100% 
Studies have also shown correlation between intense partisanship 
and strong interest in election campaigns and between party 
·
1
campbell, et al,, p. 32. 
·
2As cited in Bone Hugh, American Politics and the Party System 
(McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1965), p. 480. 
14 
identification and attitudes toward issues and candidates. The stronger 
the partisan the greater the tendency to accept the party's attitude 
toward domestic issues and its presidential candidate. 
TABLE II 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND INTEREST IN 1956 CAMPAIGN 3 
Strong Party Weak Party 
Identifiers Identifiers Independent 
Very much interested 42% 23% 25% 
Somewhat interested 38 42 43 
Not much interested 20 35 32 
Much concerned over 
outcome 82 62 51 
Traditional party identification is thus always important and 
operates as a determinant in voting, but will be lees operative in elec-
tions where there are exciting candidates and where issues are partic-
ularly important. 
In 1960 there was a basic Democratic majority in the nation. 
Throughout the campaign the Democratic presidential nominee referred to 
the theme of party loyalty. At a campaign strategy meeting it was de-
cided that he should 11make clear that the two parties were wholly dif-
ferent in goals and pin the Republican label on Nixon as highly as 
possible, hammering him as the spiritual descendant of McKinley, 
·
3
campbell, et al., p. 144. 
15 
Harding, Hoover, Landon and Dewey. 114 Nixon, by contrast, took a dif-
ferent stand. As Stanley Kelley puts it: "Vice President Nixon tried 
to induce the voter to make a choice between men. Senator Kennedy 
strove to make his choice one between parties as well as candidates. 11 •5 
An indication of how well Kennedy succeeded in rallying Democratic 
6 
sympathizers to his cause appears in Table III. 
TABLE III 
SWITCHING IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PREFERENCE 1956-1960 
IN RELATION TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
% of 1956 % of 1956 
1960 Identification Dts D-R Rts R-D 
Republican 100 (20) 32 (280) 
Democratic 4 (606) 78 (207) 
Independent 14 (105) 32 (280) 
% of new 
Voters D 
17 (176) 
86 (369) 
57 (205) 
4Theodore White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: The 
New American Library 1941), p. 320. 
5
stanky Kelley, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign", in The Presiden-
tial Election and Transition 1960-1961 (Washington: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1961),~ 65. 
·
6As cited in v. O. Key, The Resportsible Electorate (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 122. 
The form of the question was, "In politics of today do you con-
sider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?'r. The figures 
"14(105)" at the bottom of the first column mean that 105 people inter-
viewed in October 1960 said they considered themselves Independent and 
recalled voting for Stevenson in 1956, and that 14 per cent of these 
people said they were going to .vote vor Nixon in 1960. 
16 
New voters who considered themselves Democrats voted overwhelmingly 
for Kennedy, Republican new voters voted for Nixon. · Kennedy pulled 
very few 1956 Republican voters who considered themselves Republican in 
1960. But he lost few (4 per cent) of the 1960 Democratic identifiers 
who had voted Democratic in 1956. Since party identification is one of 
the most stable forces in American politics, by appealing to party 
loyalty Kennedy hoped to rally mainly Democrats who might be lost to 
him on the religious issue. 
In France at the time of the presidential election six main parties 
were registered in the French National Assembly: the Communisy Party 
(PCF), the Socialists (SFIO), the Independent Socialists (PSU), the 
Radicals, the Popular Republicans (MRP), the Gaullists (UNR), and the 
Independents. 
Electoral studies on France have revealed an astonishing permanence 
in political attitudes. In France the division of the electorate be-
tween Right and Left has for a long time dominated political life. In-
fluenced by an electoral system which allowed regrouping on the second 
ballot, the French electorate has divided into an ideological cleavage 
between all the Right on one side and all the Left on the other. The 
Right-Left cleavage has been for 150 years one of the determinants of 
French political life. 
Thus, when considering the results of legislative elections under 
the IV Republic, one finds that there was a high degree of consistency 
among the leftist electorate. See Table IV. 
However, in 1958 the percentage of the leftist electorate fell be-
low this level from 8,867»074 votes in 1958. with 22.9% abstentions to 
8,146,334 votes in 1962 with 3L2% abstentions. 
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TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF LEFTIST VOTES 1944-19567 
21 October 1944 
PC 5,024,174 
SFIO 4,491,152 
Radicals 2,018,665 
11,533,991 
2 June 1946 
PC 5,145,325 
SFIO 4,187,747 
Radicals 2,299,963 
11,633,035 
10 November 1946 
PC 5,430,593 
SFIO 3,433,901 
Radicals 2,136,152 
11,000,646 
17 June 1951 
PC 5,056.605 
SFIO 2,744,842 
Radicals 1,887,583 
9,689,030 
2 January 1956 
PC 5,514,403 
SFIO 3,247,431 
Radicals 2,389,163 
11,150,997 
Thus, in 1965 about 3,000,000 voters who generally voted for the 
Left under the IV Republic approved the presidential mandate of 
De Gaulle. They did not vote for Lecanuet, since the geographical study 
7 Francois Goguel, 11 Combien ya t.,.il eu d'electeurs de gauche parmi 
ceu~ qui ont vote le 5 decembre 1965 pour le General De Gaulle? 11 Revue 
Francaise de Science Politique, 17 (1967), pp. 65-69. 
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shows that on a national level this candidate obtained his best results 
in traditionally conservative regions under the V Republic. The actual 
division of the Left and the homogeneity of the Right has been ack-
nowledged in a sample survey. When asked to situate themselves on an 
imaginary Right/Left scale, 90 per cent of the people interviewed were 
able to do it. The question asked of ten thousan8 voters who repre-
sented the French electorate was the following: Generally the French 
are situated according to their political opinion on a continuum from 
the Left to Right. Where would you situate yourself on this continuum? 
The responses to this were extremely uniform during the years 1964, 
1965, 1966 and were recorded as follows: 8 
16% 19% 31% 17% 7% 10% 
Extreme Left Left Center Right Extreme Right. Don't Know 
According to this answer E. Deutsch divided the electorate into 
political families which could be distinguished by certain opinions 
toward the great political issues. 
8Emeric Deutsch, Denis Lindon and Pierre Weill, Les Familles 
Politiques Aujourd'hui ~ France, (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1966), 
p. 14. 
).6% 
, ; ,r 
Extreme 
Left 
19% 
Moderate 
Left 
9% 
Non-voters 
~ 17% 
Moderate 
Right 
-, 
7% 
Extreme 
Right 
• 
32" 
Floating 
Voters 
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Comparing the responses of voters for the Extreme Right and Right, 
the author noted that their opinions were not very far apart and that 
the rightist electorate constituted a homogeneous bloc~ 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF OPINIONS OF THE RIGHT AND EXTREME RIGHT 
Think one must fight against communism 
Think one must limit the right to strike 
in public services 
Think one must maintain help to private 
schools 
Think that France must have a powerful 
army 
Think one must accelerate the growth of 
the Common Market 
Think one must maintain the authority 
of the State 
Source: Deutsch, p. 33. 
Moderate 
Right 
60% 
70 
82 
54 
70 
54 
Extreme 
Right 
75% 
75 
82 
66 
64 
62 
20 
The Left on the contrary is more divided, voters of the Extreme 
Left being very different from those of the Moderate Left. On most 
\ problems the Extreme Left is unanimous. Its supporters think one must 
reduce the authority of the State 73%, suppress the nuclear striking 
force 78%, suppress public subsidies to private schools 63%, have a 
foreign policy independent of the United States 73%. The Moderate Left 
is profoundly divided, especially concerning the following issues: 
TABLE VI 
OPINION OF THE MODERATE LEFT 
Fight against communism 
Limitation of the right to strike 
Nationalizations 
Source: Deutsch, p, 34. 
Pro 
33% 
40 
34 
Against 
39% 
51 
42 
No Opinion 
28% 
9 
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After having asked the voters to situate the parties on the Right~ 
Left continuum, the interviewers asked them if they had sympathy, antip-
athy or indifference toward them. An index of acceptability was cal~ 
culated. The Extreme Left was attached to the Communist Party but 
accepted the Federation of the Left. The Moderate Left was divided: 
the party which came first was the Federation, but the Centre Democrate 
an,d UNR were also acceptedo The Right was more homogeneous: 77 per 
cent favored the.UNR. The Centre Democrate was also accepted.· The 
Centre hesitated between the UNR and the Centre Democrate. 77 per cent 
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among the .undecided were not attached to any party. 
There is a modest proportion of expressed attachment to political 
parties in France, where the majority of voters follow a general ideo-
logical orientation. Shortly before 1962, Converse and Dupeux, in a 
survey made in France to study the partisan ties felt by citizens before 
the elections, found that less than 45 per cent of those who. did not 
refuse to answer.the question, 11Which political party do you feel 
closest to?", were able to classify themselves in one of the parties or 
splinter groups, while others associated themselves with the Left or 
Right. Some confessed that they just had not been able to keep track 
of which party was which; others indicated that they found it too hard 
to choose between so many parties, or indicated preferences for a 
specific political leader while admitting that they did not know which 
party he belonged to or had no interest in the identity of his party. 
This low level of partisan identification is related to the large num-
ber of French party switchers. According to Converse and Dupeux this 
would not be a consequence of the multi-party system but of basic dis-
t . t' 't' f l't' 1 · 1' · 9 con in 1nu1 ies o po 1 ica socia 1zat1on. 
Through political socialization people acquire their political 
loyalties, beliefs and opinions. Political socialization is the grad-
ual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted and prac-
ticed by a political system. Its goal is to train or develop individ-
uals so that they will become well functioning members of political 
·
9Philip Converse, and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the 
Electorate in France and in the United States," Public Opinion Quarterll_ 
26 (Spring 1962), p. 11~ 
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society.lo Such learning begins very early in the person's life. "In 
many ways a child born into a system is like an immigrant into it. But 
where he differs is in the fact that he has never been socialized to 
any other kind of system •.• He learns to like the government before 
h 11 k h . . .. n e rea y nows w at it is. 
The family's vote in the process of political socialization is thus 
very important. The child tends·to identify with his parents and to 
adopt their outlook toward the political system. The father is the pro-
totypical authority figure and thereby initiates the child's view of 
political authority. In the United States, the degree to which partisan 
orientation, appears to be passed hereditarily from generation to gener-
ation through families has been remarked by social scientists. In a 
national sample of college graduates, Havemann and West found that 58 
per cent belonged to the same political party as their fathers. 11 If we 
disregard the independents,n they wrote, "we find that 85 per cent 
follow the politics of their fathers and only 15 per cent have 
'12 
switched." On the contrary, Converse and Dupeux found that a large 
number of the French who were willing to speak of their own party pref-
erence were unable to give the father's preference of a generation 
13 before. 
10
:Roberta Sigel, 11Assumptions About the Learning of Political 
Values," The Annals of·the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 361, September, (1965), p. 1. 
11Easton, David, and J. Dennis, nThe Child's Image of Government," 
The Annals..£!:. the American Academy..£!:. Political and Social Science, 361, 
September, (1965), pp. 56-57. 
12Havemann and West, They Went~ College, Harcourt, Brace and 
World Inc., New York, (1952), p. 117, as cited in Bone~ p. 25. 
13 Converse, p. 13. 
TABLE VII 
RESPONDENT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF FATHER'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, 
IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES (in per cent) 
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France United States 
Located father in party or broad 
tendence 
Recalled father as 11 independent, 11 
"shifting aroung," or as 
apolitical, nonvoting 
Total able to characterize father's 
political behavior 
Unable to characterize father's 
political behavior 
Father did not reside in country 
or was never a citizen 
Did not know father; question not 
asked about father surrogate 
Refused; other 
(N) 
Source: Converse, p. 12 
25 
3 
28 
68 
4 
100 
(1,166) 
76 
6 
82 
8 
3 
6 
1 
100 
(1,795) 
Of those Americans in 1958 having a known father who had resided 
in the United States as an American citizen, thereby participating in 
American political life, 86 per cent could characterize his partisan-
ship, and another 5 per cent knew enough of his political behavior to 
describe him as partisan or independent. Among comparable French 
respondents only 26 per cent could link their fathers with any party 
and another 3 per cent could describe the father's disposition as var-
iable or apolitical. 
Dupeux and Converse observed that: 
Partisan attachments appear therefore to be weakly developed 
within the less politically involved half of the French 
electorate. While undoubtedly a large variety of factors, 
including the notoriety which the French parties had acquired 
in the later years of the IV Republic, have helped to inhibit 
their development, more basic discontinuities of political 
socialization in the French fami14 appear to be making some persisting contribution as well.1 
There is therefore a striking difference between France and the 
United States on the matter of party loyalty. This absence of party 
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loyalty is associated with the political socialization process. It pre-
vents any close articulation between opinions which voters may hold and 
an appropriate party instrument. 
In the United States, the nature and strength of a person's party 
identification is the single most important factor governing his be-
havior in presidential elections. This factor has a stabilizing influ-
ence. It might therefore be expected that, due to this low level of 
party identification, the electorate in France will be more responsive 
to temporary influences, such as issues or the personality of candidates. 
In considering this factor, one notes the extent to which the 
French parties were involved in the electoral contest for the Presidency. 
How did the parties act before the campaign? They played a reduced role. 
In the spring of 1965, Gaston Deferre announced that he would be a can-
didate and attempted to establish a new political organization, the 
Federation Democrate Socialiste, which would have included SFIO, Rad-
icals, MRP, Conventions des Institutions Republicaines, but excluded 
the PC. In June 1965, MRP and SFIO bosses vetoed the idea of a joint 
Federation and Deferre withdrew from the presidential race. The Feder-
ation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste, including SFIO, Radicals, 
UDSR, and the Conventions des Institutions Republicaines, was formed in 
14Ibid., p. 14. 
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September 1965, but did not play an important role during the campaign. 
Each of the three major candidates who opposed De Gaulle -- Tixier-
Vignancour, Mitterand and Lecanuet -- obtained the support of one or 
more political parties. Each of them wanted to appeal to a sector of 
opinion much wider than the electorate of a single party. 
The SFIO, UDSR and PCF gave their formal support to Mitterand, but 
some Radicals did not support him. The Socialist party campaigned for 
Mitterand as "the sole candidate of the Left," but the full party appa-
ratus was not mobilized. There were no posters and only a few leaflets 
and tracts. Only the PCF gave strong organizational support to 
Mitterand. The MRP supported Lecanuet, who had resigned as President 
of MRP to become a candidate. The anti-Gaullist conservatives and the 
Radicals who refused their support to Mitterand supported Lecanuet. 
The Independent Republicans supported De Gaulle. 
The political preferences of the French voters were surveyed by 
two sample polls taken prior to each of the two ballotings. More than 
seven leftist voters out of few indicated a preference for Mitterand on 
the first ballot. The remaining 30 per cent of the leftist voters in-
dicated a fairly even preference distribution for De Gaulle, Lecanuet 
and Tixier-Vignancour. On the preference poll taken prior to the second 
balloting 85 per cent of the leftist voters indicated a preference for 
Mitterand, 
Voters who indicated a preference for the two Gaullist parties 
(UNR and UDT) preferred De Gaulle by 90 per cent, while Independent 
Republicans expressed 91 per cent support for De Gaulle. Among MRP 
voters, about one half supported Lecanuet on the first consultation, 
with the remainder divided among De Gaulle, Tixier-Vignancour and 
Marcilhacy. On the second ballot 70 per cent of the MRP voters ex-
pressed a preference for De Gaulle and only 30 per cent went for 
Mitterand. 
TABLE VIII 
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS AND PARTY PREFERENCE 
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965 
26 
December 1-2 December 14-16 
De Mitte- Leca- De Mitte-
Gaulle rand nuet Others Gaulle rand 
% % % % % % 
Party Preference: 
PCF, SFIO, Radicals 13 73 9 4 14 86 
MRP, Conservatives 27 5 49.5 18.5 71 29 
UNR, Gaullist Cons. 89.5 2.5 4 4 93 7 
No Preference 43 19.5 21.5 16 60 40 
Source: Sondages, 1965, noo 4, pp. 21-38i 
Interest Group Articulation 
Interest groups are important agents of political socialization. 
They are a reference for the formation of attitudes and decisions" They 
provide their members and followers with values and explanations for 
their voting. A striking feature of American politics is the extent 
to which political parties are supplemented by associations formed to 
influence public policyo In France, by contrast, the paucity of volun-
tary associations to mediate between the mass of citizens and central-
ized authority in France has been cited by !)u.verger as a crucial 
difference in the quality of the political process between the two 
countries. 
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During a presidential election in the United States, pressure 
groups campaign for party candidates and become allied to one or the 
other of the political parties, even if federal laws prohibit corpo-
rations and labor unions from making contributions from their trea~ur-
ies. The Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufactur-
ers and the American Farm Bureau Federation support the Republicans, 
while the AFI-CIO and the Farmers' Union support the Democratso Labor 
Unions raise and expend funds through specially created political com-, 
mittees such as The Committee on Political Education (AFI-CIO). Al-
though organized labor in the United States long professed to be in-
dependent, the Survey Center's sample of labor union financial contrib-
utors in 1960 showed that 73 per cent favored Kennedy's electiono 
In France there is much less ,citizen participation in associational 
groups. Thus the three main labor unions have about two millions ad-
herents, who represent 17 to 20 per cent of the workers. Only 1/6 or 
1/7 of the young people belong to a youth organization. In 1963 only 
47.6 per cent of French farmers belonged to the FNSAo Political clubs 
and associations have only a few thousand members (500 for the Club 
Jean Moulin). It is difficult to evaluate the role of French pressure 
groups during a presidential election. The GGT is closely bound up 
with the PCF, even though there is an active non-Communist minority 
within the union. Force Ouvriere is closely linked with the Socialist 
party, while the CFTC exercises some influence on the left wing of the 
MRP, which it tends to reinforce. The most important teacher associa-
tions voted for Mitterand, but the labor unions did not participate 
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actively in the campaign. The Clubs de la Convention Republicaine 
supported him. The FNSA was strongly against De Gaulle and supported 
Lecanuet. 
The survey sample showed that in American elections the proportion 
voting Democratic increases sharply as one moves down the occupational 
or income ladder" Lower paid and less skilled workers generally regard 
themselves as Democrats. The Democrats are in the minority among the 
non-manual strata and, except among the intellectuals, the Democratic 
proportion of non-manually employed voters declines with rising income 
and occupational status. Business, professional and managerial groups 
tend to vote for the Republican presidential nominee. In 1952, 58 per 
cent of a Gallup poll sample, which included doctors, lawyers and 
teachers as well as business and professional men, saw the Republican 
party as best serving the interest of business and professional people. 
TABLE IX 
VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, 
1948, 1952, 1956, AND 1960 
Occupational Group 1948 1952 1956 
Professional and Executive 19% 30% 32% 
White-collar workers 47 35 37 
Skilled workers 73 53 44 
Unskilled workers 67 67 54 
Union members 76 56 52 
Farm operators 59 36 45 
Source: Survey Research Center National Sample, as cited in 
p. 504. 
1960 
45% 
48 
60 
59 
65 
33 
Bone, 
TABLE X 
PARTY PREFERENCE OF MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASSES 
1944, 1952, 1960 
Middle Class Working Class 
29 
Party Choice 1944 1952 1960 1944 1952 1960 
Democratic 
Republican 
Other, refusal 
Source: Ibid., p. 506. 
49 
49 
2 
30 
69 
1 
71 
29 
0 
54 
43 
3 
De Gaulle received a majority of the sample vote from all occupa-
tional groups, except the blue collar workers, who preferred Mitterand 
by 55 per cent to 45 per cent, on the survey taken prior to the run-off 
election. On the first sampling of French voters by occupational 
status, De Gaulle ran ahead of all his competitors among all the status 
groups. Lecanuet who ran third, had more support than Mitterand from 
farmers, businessmen and the upper management professional groups. 
The relationship of socio-economic position to political behavior 
is reinforced by religious and ethnic factors. Religious affiliation 
plays an important role in determining political affiliation. Surveys 
indicate that among the Christian denominations, the higher the average 
income of the membership of a church group, the more likely the members 
are to vote Republican. According to the average socio-economic status 
of their membership, Christian religious groups in the United States are 
Congregational, Presbyterian~ Episcopal, Methodist, Lutheran, Baptist 
TABLE XI 
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS 
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965 
December 1-2 December 14-16 
Per cent Per cent 
of De Mitte- Leca- of De 
· ·sample· ·Gaulle rand nuet Others Sample Gaulle 
Occupation of head of family: 
Farmers 15 38 22 28 42 17 59 
Industialists and 
businessmen 11 44 14 24 18 10 67 
Upper management and 
free professionals 5 32 23 26.5 18.5 5 63 
Middle management, technicians 
and white collar 18 38.5 31.5 21 9 15 55 
Workers 30 42.5 34 16 7o5 33 45 
Retires and non-working 21 52 24.5 14 9.5 20 60 
Source: Sondages 1965, no. 4, pp. 21-23. 
Mitte-
rand 
41 
33 
37 
45 
55 
40 
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and Catholic 9 15 and this rank order is the same when the denominations 
are ranked by propensity to vote Republicano However religious beliefs 
or loyalties have independent effect on voting behavior. Working class 
protestants belonging to the Congregational or Presbyterian Churches are 
more likely to be Republicans than workers who are Baptist or.Catholic. 
Wealthy Baptists or Catholics are more apt to be Democrats than equally 
rich Congregationalists or Episcopalians. 
Differences also appear between ethnic groups: Anglo-Saxons are 
more likely to be Republican than other Americans in the.same position 
who have a more recent immigrant background.· Ethnic and racial politics 
are found in every part of the United States. Big city subnational 
groups tend to associate with the Democratic party but, like others in 
the electorate, their party attachment can be shaken by events and can-
didates. Ethnic background, however, is unlikely to be a determinative 
factor in an election, because it is very often modified or reinforced 
by su.ch factors as socio-economic status and religion. 
In 1960, the cleavage between White America and Negro America 
acquired a particular importanceo In a Gallup poll in 1960, 49 per 
cent of white respondents identified as Democrats, while 60 per cent of 
16 the Negroes so designated themselves. The Center found that 70 per 
cent of the Negro voters voted for Kennedy in 1960. The distinctive-
ness of the Negro vote and its Democratic preference is said to be due 
to the fact that Negroes have been in a lower socio-economic status and 
15
seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 
(1963), p. 306. 
16Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Race Relations," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 26 (1961), pp. 137-148. 
have a strong identity with their group, but this vote, like that of 
other groups, varies by region" Southern Negroes are less Democratic 
than in the North. 
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Among other minority groups the Jewish minority comprises one of 
the most Democratic groups to be found in the electorate. The AIPO poll 
noted that 80 per cent of Jewish voters voted for Kennedy in 1960. Evi-
dence of the constancy of Jewish support for Democratic candidate is 
also shown by the fact that upper income and age levels within the 
Jewish community fail to vote Republican, in contrast to the behavior 
of most other ethnic groups. 
In France the majority of Frenchmen are Catholics, at least nom-
inally; Jews, and protestants, although they occupy some key positions, 
are negligible in the vote. Religious or practicing Catholics tend to 
vote for conservative parties. Catholics whose church membership is 
only nominal and freethinkers tend to support Communist, Socialist or 
Radical parties. 
Unassimilated ethnic groups such as Algerian Muslims, Italian 
immigrants in the South, and postwar refugees from Eastern Europe do 
not have an important bearing upon the vote. 
There is also a high correlation between a person's voting and his 
education, sex and age, Thus, in the United States, there is wide-
spread support among the middle class intellectual groups -- artists, 
professors, scientists -- for the Democratic party. Political scien-
tists are among the most Democratic of the academic groupings. To ex-
plain the sources of American intellectual' leftism, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel has pointed out that there is a conflict between the values 
of the business classes and creative artistso Business is committed to 
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giving its clientele what it wants; the creative artist evaluates his 
product independently of its immediate market value. 17 Seymour Lipset 
has explained the liberalism of Am.erican intellectuals by factors 
specific to this country and its history, The historic ideology of the 
United States has contained the equalitarian dogmas of the Declaration 
of Independence, which are the values of the democratic Left everywhere. 
Thus, concern with equality has fostered the objectives of equality of 
opportunity of achievement for all, while the European leftist parties 
have concentrated on protecting the underprivileged from unsecurity 
through social security, government ownership and cultural activities. 
However, the major explanation of the political behavior of American 
intellectuals is said to be due to the fact that they are an under-
privileged group -- low on income and power compared with business men 
d f . l 18 an pro essiona s. 
In the United States the electorate is evenly divided between the 
sexes. The Gallup figures for 1960 show no difference in voting be-
havior between men and women. Party attachment. shows differences be-
tween younger voters, who are more Democratic, and persons over fifty, 
who are more Republican. The Center's panel also found that young 
people are less tied to the party system and more attracted to candi-
dates than to parties. 
French women are generally more conservative than the men. They 
were not permitted to vote until after the Liberation in 1944, and have 
17Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental 
Historians" in F. Ao Hayek, C~pitalism and the Historians (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 118-120. 
181· 346 ipset, p. • 
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always been more sensitive to the prestige of De Gaulle. In the 
October 1962 referendum, according to a survey of the French Institute 
for Public Opinion, 42 per cent of the men voted "no" compared to 25 
per cent of the women. In the presidential election of 1965 women ex-
pressed more support for De Gaulle than men and less for Mitterandc 
The vote for the other candidates was about the same for men and for 
women. 
TABLE XII 
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS BY SEX 
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965 
December 1-2 December 
Per cent Per cent 
14-16 
of De Mitte- Leca- of De Mitte-
Sample Gaulle rand nuet Others Sample Gaulle rand 
Sex: 
Men 47 38.5 32.5 20 9 50 49 51 
Women 53 47 23.5 20 9.5 50 61 39 
Source: Sondag es 1965, no. 4, pp. 21-23. 
The political difference between sexes is related to differences in 
the religious attitudes of the two sexes (Table XIII)·. In view of the 
relationship between religious feeling and political opinion, it is 
normal that women who, compared to men, are more religious and more 
sympathetic to the recommendations of the Church, tend to vote for the 
parties which directly or indirectly are backed by the Church. The 
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TABLE XIII 
DIFFERENCE IN RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN, 19ARTICULARLY AMONG THE WORKING CLASS (in percentage) 
Catholics Without Other 
Active· Nonactive Religion Religions 
Industrial workers 
men 16 61 20 3 
women 40 47 10 3 
Agricultural workers 
men 26 59 13 2 
women 50 42 6 2 
Small clerks, civil servants 
men 31 52 15 2 
women 36 47 14 3 
Shopkeepers, craftsmen 
men 27 53 14 6 
women 44 44 6 6 
Industrialists, profession-
als, upper civil servants, 
managers 
men 39 39 17 5 
women 42 36 17 5 
Farmers 
men 52 39 5 4 
women 64 29 3 4 
Retired people 
men 30 55 12 3 
women 56 34 7 3 
Total 
men 32 51 14 3 
women 47 42 8 3 
19. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Party Systems ~ Voter Align-
ments (New York: The Free Press 1967) p. 230, 
difference between masculine and feminine suffrage is greatest among 
industrial workers, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, and small 
farmers, than in the bourgeoisie and middle classes. Women belonging 
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to the bourgeoisie or to the upper strata of the middle bourgeoisie have 
sufficient socio-economic reasons not to vote Communist or Socialist. 
It is difficult to determine which of the two variables, religious 
feeling or socio-economic status; most ip.fluences their vote, because 
men in the same social condition also vote conservative. No important 
discrepancy between feminine and masct,1line voting patterns appears in 
this prestigious social class. 
Age accounts for significant differences in voting behavior in 
France, the attitudes of young people.concurring with those of men, and 
the attitude of older persons with that of women. In both samplings 
young people expressed support more often for Mitterand and for Lecanuet 
than for De Gaulle. The vote for De Gaulle increased with age, the 
President receiving the consensus of an absolute majority among voters 
more than 64 years old. 
TABLE XIV 
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PREFERENCES BY AGE 
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965 
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December 1-2 December 14-16 
Per cent Per cent 
of Mitte- Leca- of De Mitte-
Sample Gaulle rand nuet Others Sample Gaulle rand 
Age: 
20-34 30 35 32.5 21 11.5 29 49 51 
35-49 28 37 29 24.5 9.5 30 55 45 
50-64 26 47 27 19 7.0 25 55 45 
65 & over 16 58.5 19 11 11.5 16 65 35 
Source: Sondages 19650 
CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF ISSUES AND THE PERSONALITIES OF 
CANDIDATES ON VOTERS IN FRANCE AND IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The United States 
Issues refer to a person's attitude toward current questions of 
what government should do regardless of which party or individual holds 
office. However, in order for an issue to affect partisan choice at 
the polls, a person must not only be aware of it but identify it with 
a party or a candidate. How much do American voters know or care about 
issues in a presidential election? The Survey Research Center found 
in 1956 that a typical voter is not very concerned about most of the 
issues that agitate political leaders and fill the news columns; that 
voters are more concerned about and have more information on general 
issues than on specific ones; that the voter's picture of the parties 
. 1 
and candidates' stand on many issues is often unclear and inaccurate. 
In order to analyse the role of issues in presidential elections, 
it is first necessary to note what the voters saw and heard in the 
election of 1960; then what they themselves perceived as the major prob-
lems before the country and how their feelings about issues coincided 
with and deviated from party preferences. 
1 Campbell, p. 174. 
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Among domestic questions in the last years of the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration, the state of the economy elicited most attention: the 
decrease of industrial production and the increase of the number of un-
employed workers, which presented the issue of government mis-management 
of the economy; the problems of an important increase of the population; 
the problems of federal aid to education, the raising of the statutory 
minimum wage, civil rights; medical care, and farm policy were other 
long-standing issues which precipitated proposals for actions and dis-
putes about action. 
In foreign policy, where presidential predominance is unquestion-
able, the situation was disturbing, though peace of a sort prevailed. 
Relations with the Soviet Union were at a standstill. The loss of the 
U-2 reconnaissance plane over Russia had given Kruschchev a pretext for 
wrecking a summit meeting with Eisenhower. The explanation of the U-2 
affair provided criticism of the administration. International detente 
became an issue of the electoral campaign. The Congo, Laos, Cuba, and 
Berlin were subjects of preoccupation as was the issue of whether the 
United States should defend Quemoy and Matsu. 
The favorite themes of the campaign among Democrats were the de-
crease of the international prestige of the United States, the lack of 
leadership and initative of the Republican administration, and the 
domestic recession. Criticism of the inadequacy of the defense cap-
ability of the country was also raised by Democrats. Candidates ex-
pressed agreement on many basic propositions. No single over-riding 
issue of public policy came to the fore. In the first presidential 
debate Vice President Nixon said, "I agree with Senator Kennedy com-
pletely on that score. Where we disagree is in the means that we would 
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use to get the most out of our economy"" 2 
What did the voters themselves perceive as the major problems be-
fore the country? One question asked by Dr. Gallup's interviewers was 
the following: rrWhat do you think is the most important problem facing 
this country today?" The responses by those who, at the time of inter-
view, had expressed a choice between the presidential candidates were 
3 
recorded as follows: 
TABLE XV 
FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
Threat of war 18% 
Foreign relations, communicating understanding, getting 
along with other people and nations 18 
Relations with Russia (no mention of war threat) 9 
Threat of Communism, threat of communistic countries other 
than Russia 8 
Cuba, Castro, etc. 7 
Threat of war with Russia 5 
Problems of Defense, atomic warfare, U. S. military strength 
lag, preparedness 5 
DOMESTIC POLICY 
Domestic economic problems, inflation, higher prices, ect. 
Unemployment 
Racial problems, segregation, integration, discrimination 
Education problems, crowded buildings, fewer teachers, 
and low pay 
2Wh. 1.te, p. 403. 
\s cited in Key, pp, 130-131, 
12% 
7 
6 
2 
Although a generalized concern over foreign policy problems and 
the maintenance of peace was widespread in 1960, it was not so strong 
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a factor pushing voters toward one party as foreign policy concerns had 
been in 1952. The campaign of 1960 was not devoid of foreign policy 
issues. They just never became decisive, though at times it looked as 
though they might. 
The state of American prestige abroad was cited by less than one 
per cent of the voting population. Farm policy was mentioned by one 
per cent of those interviewed and social security and medical care by 
less than one half of one per cent. Domestic economic.policy and un-
employment received more emphasis; close to one American in every five 
put these issues above even war and peace and relations with the com-
munist world. Public policy issues did not appear to have had an im-
portant bearing upon the voters' choice of presidential candidates, 
since poll results indicated that the voters who cited the threat of 
war. and problems of getting along with other nations. as major problems 
favored Nixon. The voters who were most preoccupied with domestic 
issues were for Kennedy. Those who cited domestic economic policy or 
racial problems reported by two to one their intention to vote for 
Kennedy; among those who cited education, three to one were for Kennedy 
and among those who expressed concern with unemployment Kennedy led 
Nixon by five to one. 
After getting voters to list what they regarded as the most im-
portant problems before the country, the Gallup poll's interviewers 
then asked them which party would be. better to handle the problem. 
The responses were recorded as follows: 
TABLE XVI 
PATTERNS OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1956-1960 
Response D-D. .R-:-D. 0-Da ... 0-:-Ra D-R R-R 
Republican 1% 5% 7% 26% 52% 81% 
Democratic 79 63 65 8 12 1 
No difference 13 17 10 16 20 10 
No opinion 5 12 14 17 3 7 
No answer 2 3 4 3 13 1 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
(6 78) (348) (469) (298) (61) (850) 
This was in response to the question: "Which political party do 
you think can do a better job of handling the problem (the most im-
portant problem facing this country) you have just mentioned -- the 
Republican party or the Democratic Party?" 
Source: Key, p. 134. 
aNon-voters in 1956. 
There was a strong correlation between the voters' response to this 
question and their vote intention in the Kennedy-Nixon presidential 
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contest. Voters who thought that the party they had voted for in 1956 
was best able to handle the most important problem before the country 
in 1960 remained with the party they had supported in 1956. The more 
strongly the person felt his Republicanism or Democraticism, the more 
strongly he supported the Republican or Democratic attitude toward 
public issues both foreign and domestic. According to Dr .• Gallup's 
samples few respondents shifted from Democratic to Republican between 
1956-1960, while some Republicans switched to the Democratic party. 
Since the candidates agreed on many basic propositions and no 
basic issue of public policy came to the fore, the influence of party 
identification seemed to have had a more important bearing upon the out-
come of the election than issueso 
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American politics is sometimes spoken as a "politics of personal-
ity". This would mean that in a presidential election year voters pay 
little attention to party labels or issue positions and vote for the 
candidate whom they believe to be ttthe better man". The charisma of 
the man would supervene over party tradition. Max Weber distinguished 
three types of power: legal authority which rests upon the function 
that a person exercises, traditional authority which rests upon custom, 
and charismatic authority which rests on the affectual and personal 
devotion of the follower. Obedience is given exclusively to the leader 
as a person for the sake of his non-routine qualities. Charisma, mean-
ing literally "gift of grace", was used to characterize self~appointed 
leaders who. are followed by those who are in distress and who need to 
follow the leader because they believe him to be extraordinarily qual-
ified. Pure charismatic leaders and followers are ideal types unlikely 
to bound in an actual situationo But there are undoubtedly some charis-
matic tendencies in all candidates for popularly elected office. 
Kennedy was the second Catholic .to be a presidential candidate of 
a major par:ty the other having been the Democrat Smith in 1928. He 
was also only the second United States senator to be the presidential 
candidate of a major party, the other being the Republican Harding in 
1920. He was also the youngest presidential candidate ever nominated 
by a major party -- only 43 years old. 
Nixon was 47 and was the first Vice President to be designated as 
a candidate for the presidency for more than a century. Both were ex-
perienced politicians, party men, orators quick to improvise" Both 
were moderates, at equal distance from the extreme right and left of 
their parties. 
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Studies have shown that the four great debates had an immense im-
pact on the furtunes of the two candidates. Those debates might have 
been an opportunity for a discussion of issues. White acknowledges that: 
The television debates did little to advance the reasonable dis-
cussion of issues a •• What they did was to give the voters of a 
great democracy a living portrait of two men under stress and 
let the voters decide by instinct and emotion, which style and 
pattern of behavior under stress they preferred in their 
leader. o ., The television debates generalized the tribal sense 
of participation, the emotional judgment of the leader.from 
the few to the multitude ••• Rarely in American history has there 
been a political4campaign that discussed issues less or clar-ified them less< 
For Nixon, the television debates were a disastero The personal-
ity of a candidate is a factor which has an important bearing upon the 
voter's decision. However another question arises, how did this var-
iable interrelate with party identification? In 1952 many voters who 
were not Republicans were drawn to Eisenhower because of his symbolic 
qualities and personal attributes. If one contrasts the structure of 
the vote for the presidency with that for the two parties as expressed 
in congressional and local races, one notices that in 1960 the American 
people chose the most conservative Congress in six years. The Demo-
cratic majority of 262 Representatives in the House included 101 Demo-
crats who were permanent allies of the Republicans on most domestic 
matters. White states that: 
If the Democratic Party at best in 1960 held even with the 
Republicans and at worst suffered a defeat only one lasting 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom; that the election of 1960 
was a personal victory of J. Kennedy not for his party. When 
one stops off the Old South where American politics are dis-
torted by the race problem Kennedy in the states of hi§ most 
important victories ran ahead of his party-not behind. 
4White, po 332. 
5 
Ibid. , p • 40 8 • 
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In France,. the Journal Officiel of November 19, published the list 
of candidates certified by the Constitutional Council, which functions 
as the Election Board for presidential elections: J. L. Tixier-
Vignancour a fifty-eight year old lawyer and militant of the Extreme-
Right; Pierre Marcilhacy; a fifty-five year old journalist, lawyer and 
senator, unsupported by any party; Francois Mitterand, a.51 year old 
deputy of the moderate leftist UDSR and former Minister under the Fourth 
Republic, S\lpported by the entire Left; Charles De Gaulle, the seventy-
five year old incumbent President and candidate of the UNR and moderate 
Right; J. Lecanuet a forty-five year old philosophy professor, deputy 
and leader of the MRP; M, Barbu, a fifty-eight year old worker, artisan 
and organizer of the community Boimondeau, unsupported by any political 
organization. 
The main issues in the 1945 presidential election campaign involved 
the De Gaulle constitution and the economic, social military and fo·reign 
policies of the D~ Gaulle government. The candidates developed the 
issues in the following manner. On September 23, 1965, Mitterand, in 
his press conference, announced his program in seven "Options" and 
twenty-eight propositions, which were concerned with institutions, lib-
erties, foreign policy, striking force, economic policy, social justice, 
and national education. He proposed that Parliament should abrogate 
Articles 11 and 16 of the Constitution" Article 16 and Article 11 
modify the articles concerning the Constitutional Council, the Superior 
Counci.1 of Magistrature and the Economic Council as well as the pro-
cedures for amending the Coµstitution. Concerning civil liberties, 
Mitterand advocated the suppression of all exceptional legislation, 
enactm~nt of a statute on radio and television, the. abrogation of the 
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1964 laws restraining the right to strike, and the creation of a 
national fund for local communitieso As far as foreign policy was con-
cerned, Mitterand as~ed for the strengthening of the Common Market, the. 
creation of a European political authority based upon universal suffrage, 
the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance with modification of NATO, 
participation by France in the disarmament conference, approval of the 
treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear arms, signature of the Moscow 
pact, aid to developing nations through the organization of a world 
market for raw materials, support for the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, 
and admission of China to the United Nations. Mitterand proposed to 
abolish the independent French nuclear striking force, elaborate a new 
economic plan, and create a ministry for economic planning. He also 
advocated a fiscal policy to help the most disadvantaged groups and 
measures to improve working conditions for women and housing. 
Preceding the first ballot, the opponents of the De Gaulle devoted 
much time to challenging his record of having restored social peace to 
Franceo Mitterand and Lecanuet stressed their youth, questioned De 
Gaulle's fitness and accused him of flouting his own constitution. All 
of the opposition candidates dissociated themselves from the existing 
splinter party system. Tixier-Vignancour, Mitterand and Lecanuet each 
declared his intention to build a new and vigorous political party 
better adapted to the new world than the old machines. Lecanuet made 
this need for a re-vitalization of the parties the central note of his 
final television broadcasto All the opponents of De Gaulle called for 
an expanding instead of a stagnant economy and compained that France 
was lagging behind other Common Market countries. They all denounced 
the shortage of schools and housing and appealed for the support of the 
women. They accused the President of sabatoging European unity and 
condemned France's nuclear deterrento 
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There was little difference between the candidates of the oppo-
sition; from Tixier-Vignancour to Mitterand, each was for democracy, 
the increase of public welfare, an integrated Europe, the Atlantic 
Alliance, and against the nuclear striking force and high taxes. 
Mitterand stressed the fact that he was the candidate of the Left; 
Lecanuet appealed to disgruntled Gaullist voters and to the Socialists 
as well as his own MRP group; Tixier exploited public reaction to the 
Algerian events. 
The extent to which the campaign over issues was a factor of sig-
nificance in persuading voters cannot be precisely evaluated. No 
special issue of public policy came to the fore, and it is difficult to 
say that the results constituted a defeat or victory of issues such as 
the De Gaulle regime, the economic plan, the Atlantic alliance or 
Europe are integration. The electorate was not called upon to support 
structured programs or particular issues, but the candidates as per-
sonalities. Issues do not seem to have been a major factor in moti-
vating voters in their choice of candidates. 
Thus, foreign policy was stressed by 10 per cent of the voters 
who supported Mitterand, and 25 per cent of those who voted for 
Lecanuet. The issue of personal power was considered significant by 
10 per cent of the voters of the opposition. As far as social and 
economic policy was concerned, dissatisfaction by farmers with agri-
cultural policy undermined De Gaulle on the first ballot and provoked 
a second ballot by giving to Lecanuet votes which would otherwise have 
gone to De Gaulle. 
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On the first ballot, the voters of the Extreme Left supported 
Mitterand because he was the candidate of the Left. The support which 
the Communist Party gave to Mitterand influenced most of the Communist 
voters. The television appearances of Mitterand built up his image 
among the voters of the Extreme LefL Because Mitterand was the candi-
date of the Left and appeared the most able to direct a policy of social 
and economic progress, two-thirds of the Moderate Left voted for him on 
the first ballot. Those who did not (mostly Radicals) were fearful 
that a change of leadership might result in instability of the regime. 
To the question, "which candidate seems to you more apt to insure 
a government of stability?" moderate leftists responded as follows: 
61% De G,aulle 
7% Mitterand 
3% Lecanuet 
29% Without opinion 
Those leftist voters who did not vote for Mitterand gave the 
following reasons: 
Stability would be threatened - 60% 
The Communists were supporting him - 30 
Personal preference for somebody 
else than Mitterand 
Europe or Common Market 
- 25% 
- 10% 
At the beginning of the electoral campaign the Right and Center 
intended to support De Gaulle, who satisfied the need for order and 
stability which those voters felt, and had the prestige and authority 
which they highly valued in a leader" The main reasons given by people 
who voted for Lecanuet were his youth and personal attractiveness and 
6 
the fact that he was "for Europe11 o 
VOTERS PREFERRED MITTERAND: 
Because he was the candidate of the Left 42% 
Because De Gaulle was not concerned with welfare 26 
Because Mitterand would modernize the country 24% 
VOTERS PREFERRED LECANUET~ 
Because he was young 40% 
Because he was attractive 40% 
Because he was the candidate of the Center 21% 
Because De Gaulle was not concerned with welfare 20% 
VOTERS PREFERRED DE GAULLE: 
Because he best represen~ed France 44% 
To insure stable government 40% 
Because he has shown ability to govern 34% 
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7 In a survey taken in 1966 by the Foundaton Nationale. des Sciences 
Politiques on the population of Bologne-Billancourt .concerning the 
motivations of the voters on the first and second ballots, the answers 
given corroborated the preceding results. Thirty-four .per cent of these 
voters on the first ballot were inclined to vote for General De Gaulle 
because they desired stability, 27% because he was a great man, 17% out 
6 Deutsch, p. 23. 
7Guy Michelat, and Janine Mossuz, nLes Elections Presidentielles 
dans une localite de la Region Parisienne", Revue Francaise des 
Sciences Politiques, 16 (April, 1966), po 566. ~ 
The analysis of the motivations of the votes in the two ballots 
was on the question: "What are the main reasons which make you.choose 
this candidate?" Which was following the question: "Can you tell me. 
for whom did you vote?" The survey was made upon 1427 persons, and 
realized in January, 1966" 
of gratitude. On the second ballot, stability was less significant; 
and only 25 per cent voted for this reason.· 
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On the first ballot five reasons influenced the voters who sup-
ported Mitterand. The first four concerned the ideology and program of 
the Left; the last concerned their opposition to General De Gaulle (18 
per cent). On the second ballot the opposition to De Gaulle increased 
to 29 per cent of the voters. Only 13 per cent of the voters cast 
their ballot for Mitterand because he was the candidate of the Left and 
12 per cent because he was nearer the workers. 
The most important elements in the vote for Lecanuet were his 
program, 29 per cent, Europe 29 per cent. and opposition to General 
De Gaulle, 28 per cent. The youth of the candidate was mentioned by 
24 per cent of his voters. 40 per cent of those who voted for Tixier-
Vignancour did so because of Algeria; 28 per cent because he was anti-
Gaullist, and 28 per cent because of his program. 
Thus, through the reasons given by the electors, it appears that 
voters did not vote so much on programs or on issues but on personal-
ities. The need for security and stability was the most important 
factor favoring De Gaullea Traditional attachment to a party favored 
Mitterand. 
TABLE XVII 
REASONS FOR VOTERSt PREFERENCES 
For De Gaulle 
Stability Security 
De Gaulle is a Great Man 
Against Mitterand 
Foreign Policy 
Gratitude 
Nationalism, Patriotism 
Economic Policy 
Against IV Republic 
Diverse 
Without Opinion 
For Mitterand 
He is nearer Workers 
Economic and Social Policy 
Nearer my Ideas 
Candidate of the Left 
Against De Gaulle 
Against Striking Force 
He is Young 
He is a Democrat 
Because De Gaulle is Personal Power 
Diverse 
No Opinion 
For Lecanuet 
Program 
Europe 
Against De Gaulle 
He is Ypung 
Personal Qualities 
Domestic Policy 
One Must Give New Blood to Politics 
Diverse 
1st. Ballot 
34 
27 
14 
17 
12 
5 
3 
9 
3 
(516) 
21 
21 
20 
19 
18 
9 
7 
4 
4 
17 
2 
(300) 
29 
29 
28 
24 
10 
8 
3 
18 
(179) 
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2ndo Ballot 
25 
18 
19 
9 
10 
9 
4 
4 
9 
10 
(627) 
12 
20 
18 
13 
29 
5 
4 
5 
4 
14 
8 
(376) 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
1st. Ballot 2nd. Ballot 
For Tixier-Vignartcour 
Because of Algeria 40 
He is the Most Anti-Gaullist 28 
His Program 28 
Personal Qualities 16 
For France 5 
Against Aid to Underdeveloped Countries 5 
Diverse 14 
No Opinion 2 
(43) 
Alh results given in this table are in percentage; the figure 
between parenthesis indicates the effective on which the percentage 
is ~alculated. 
CHAPTER 'N 
IDEOLOGIES AS A DETERMINANT OF VOTING 
Ideology and Voting in the United States 
The phenomenon of ideology is certainly one of the most important 
dynamic influences in politics. Ideologies such as Christianity, 
nationalism or communism can create or destroy civilization, topple 
governments or change the face of the world and have. 
By origin and usage ideologies are primarily political, although 
we expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order, 
such as social and economic relationships and religion. Daniel Bell 
regards ideologies as: 
Systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, 
that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge histori-
cal events, identify political right and wrong, set fort.I), the 
interconnections (casual and moral) between politics and other 
spheres of activity and furnish guide for action. 
The elements of American democratic ideology are considered to be such 
concepts as consensus, accountability, limited or constitutional govern-
ment, equal representation, majority rule, minority rights, freedom of 
political opposition, freedom of thought, speech, press, and assembly, 
equality of opportunity, religious toleration, equality before the law, 
right of judicial due process. 
There is substantial agreement in American society regarding the 
1 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideologx (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960)~ 
p. 25. ---
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legitimacy of the ruling authority. 2 According to Robert Dahl, it is 
nearly impossible to find an American who says that he is opposed to 
democracy or favors some alternative. Mo13 t Americans display comp la-
cency about their economic institutions. The great corporations have 
gained acceptance. The trade-unions are unpopular, among some, but few 
would like to see trade-unions done away with altogether. There is 
consensus about the fundamental values or the rules of the games in the 
society, even if there are differences of philosophy between the two 
great American parties. The Democratic party, for instance, emphasizes 
the fact that the government must be used as an instrument of social 
reform. This philosophy has gathered citizen groups who wish to use 
government for new social programs, minority groups who want from gov-
ernment protection and advancement, labor groups and farmers who want 
to extend the economic role of government. The Republican philosophy, 
in contrast, asserts .that each ci.ti.zen bears a responsibility in pri-
vate and community life greater than the responsibility of government 
to shape that life and community. However all the candidates and 
elected officials of the two major parties accept the legitimacy of the 
basic social, economic and political structures. 
Previous studies have shown that in the United States a majority 
of the electorate al.so accepts the political system as legitimate and 
rejects radical and extreme movements which want to alter or overthrow 
the constitutional foundations of the system. V .O .. Key found that the 
political class is more united than the. electorate on fundamental 
. 
2
'Ro'bert Dahl~ A Pluralist Democracy in t:he United States, Rand 
McNally Company s (Chicago, 1967) ~ p. 330. - ---
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political values, but divides more sharply on the issues which separate 
the two parties, . Thus the ideology of democracy tends to unite Ameri-
cans. 
Nonetheless, Americans have often disagreed how far democracy and 
equality should be extended, how widely the advantages enjoyed by elite 
groups should be distributed throughout the general population, how 
much equality of opportunity and of power is desirable. Originally the 
controversy among the Founders between those who wanted an aristocratic 
republic and those who wanted a democratic republic was just an ideo-
logical cleavage. These two ideological viewpoints have reappeared 
since the Constitutional Convention. The one which stresses equality 
and democracy is liberalism, the other conservatism. Voters of higher 
status tend to be conservative in ideology and are likely to vote 
Republican, while voters of lower status tend to be more liberal in 
ideology and are more likely to vote Democratic. According to Dahl a 
line of cleavage separates people according to status, ideology and 
3 party. 
Status 
Ideology 
Party 
Camp I 
Upper 
Conservative 
Pro. Republican 
Camp II 
Lower 
Liberal 
Pro. Democratic 
Each tende.ncy is important, yet none is strong enough to exert a 
dominant influence on American political life, The connection between 
status and party is imperfect, In every occupational or status group 
a minority holds opinions diverse from the prevalent views. For 
3
~obert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Chicago: 
Rand McNally and Company~ 1967, p, 358 
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instance, many manual workers are as conservative as non-manual work-
ers, and many non-manual workers are liberal. The link between party 
and ideology is not overwhelmingly powerful. Both parties have been 
supported by conservatives and liberals. Low-status Republicans might 
be highly liberal on domestic issues, while high status Democrats, 
like high status Republicans, are likely to be conservative. 
According to Dahl, the ideologies of conservatism and liberalism 
are made up of different di.mensions -- economic reform, political and 
civil liberties, foreign policy, att~tudes toward social change. Con-
sequently people who are close together along one dimension of 
liberalism-conservatism may be apart along another dimension. Thus, 
the dimensions of liberalism and conservatism divide Americans one 
way on one kind of issue and another way on another kind of issue. 
This ideological cleavage does not assume an important role in the 
4 
nation. Surveys in 1960 even showed that many people have only weak 
traces of liberal or conservative ideological framework within which 
to judge political issues, candidates and parties. The people were 
asked: "Would you say that either one of the parties is more conserva-
tive or more liberal than the other?" Respondents who said yes were 
asked which party seemed the more conservative and, then "What do you 
have in mind when you say that the Republicans (Democrats) are more 
conservative than the Democrats (Republicans)?" Thirty seven per cent 
of the respondents "could supply no meaning for the liberal-
conservative distinction." Slightly more than fifty per cent of the 
respondents furnished evidence that they could identify the meaning 
4 Campbell et al., p. 249. 
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of these twins correctly, more or less. To a majority, liberalism was 
equated with government spending and conservatism with economy. 
The slight ideological framework within which most Americans view 
political problems was examplified by a national sampling of American 
voters in 1956. 5 The respondents were asked whether there was "any-
thing in particular that you like about the Democratic Party," or any-
thing 11 that you don I t like?" The same questions were asked about the 
Republican Party. The answers people gave indicated that some thought 
in terms of a liberal-conservative scale of some sort; others cited 
possible benefits or dangers to this or that group -- to farmers, 
workers, doctors, big business. A third group commented about the 
goodness or badness of the times -- peace or war, prosperity or re-
cession. A fourth group made no comments at all on the political 
issues under debate. (See Table XVIII) 
H. McClosky found that in the United States the influences which 
prevent ideological cleavages from assuming an important role in the 
nation's political life would be, for example, political institutions 
such as federalism, checks and balances, separation of powers, bi-
cameralism, the congressional committee system, and a system of elec-
tions more often fought around local issues and personalities than 
around national questions. The two party system disguises disagree-
ments that exist between active Democrats and active Republicans. 
5 Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
Politics," in Ideology and Discontent, David E. Apter, ed., (New York: 
The Free Press, 1964) 9 pp. 206-261. 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
TABLE XVIII 
IDEOLOGUES AND NON=IDEOLOGUES AMONG AMERICAN VOTERS 
Total Sample Voters 
Ideologues 2\% 3\% 
Near Ideologues 9 1.2 
Group Interest 42 45 
Nature of the Times 24 22 
No Issue Content 221: 
--2. 17\ 
100% 100% 
The Americans social system contributes to the same end, 
for it is a model of the pluralistic society, a profuse 
collection of diverse groups, interests and organizations 
spread over a vast and variegated territory ... The com-
plexities of a highly pluralistic social and political 
order to tend to diminish the impact of intellectual dif-
ferences to compel compromise, and to discourage the 
holders of divergent views frgm crystallizing into 
intransigent doctrinal camps. 
Religion and Voting in the United States 
Religious affiliation plays an important role in determining 
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political affiliation in the United States. America as a civilization 
began with religion. The first immigrants from England and Europe 
came scarred by religious wars of that era fought between Protestant 
sects. Not until the 1850 1 s did the Protestant civilization of 
America begin to include a proportion of Catholics, and then it was 
6 Herbert, McClosky, ''Consensus and Ideology in American Poli-· 
tics," American Political. Science Review, Vol. 58 (1964), p. 214. 
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a Catholicism confined to cities of the Eastern borders and the New 
Orleans community. 
In general most Catholics voted Democratic for reasons quite apart 
from faith; as a group, American Catholics are ordinarily lower in eco-
nomic status than Protestants and one has seen that wealthier people 
and people with business interests usually voted Republican. Samplings 
in Elmira, New York, and Philadelphia stated that upper-strata Catho-
lies tended to vote Republican, although less than upper-strata Protes-
tants. Events brought the religious question to the surface in the 
1960 campaign. For some people it reinforced the;pull of partisanship; 
for others it ran counter to the tugs of party loyalty. Concern over 
the religious issue was wide spread throughout the American electorate. 
The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan found in a 
pre-election interview that nearly 40 per cent of the sample voluntarily 
introduced the subject of religion before any direct probing was in-
itiated by the interviewer, which testifies to the importance of re-
ligion among the voters during the campaign. On September 7, 1960, a 
group of Protestant churchmen issued a public statement questioning the 
wisdom of choosing any man of the Roman Catholic faith for President. 7 
Kennedy appeared before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association in 
Houston, Texas, to discuss his religion and his fitness to serve as 
President, Protestants were subjected to conflicting pushes by the 
campaign. Their religion tended to prompt Protestant Democratic de-
fectors of 1956 to remain in Republican ranks; their partisanship 
7Philip Converse, 11 Stability and Change in 1960; A Reinstating 
Election," The American Political Science Fe,view, LV (June 1961), p. 
276. 
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tended to draw them to Kennedy. Converse shows that the defection to 
Nixon among Protestants who were identified in 1960 with the Democratic 
party is correlated with regularity of attendance at a Protestant 
church, and that the impact of the religious factor was not the same 
in the North and South.a 
Polls taken after the elections showed that only three per cent 
of Protestant-Republicans voted for Kennedy, while 23 per cent of 
Protestant-Democrats voted for Nixon. Forty-three per cent of all in-
dependent voters voted for Kennedy, while only 28 per cent among.Protes-
tant independents voted for him. 9 
County data suggests that there were variations from place to place 
in the voting behavior of Protestants and Catholics. Kennedy's losses 
were especially heavy in the Midwest and in the South, where he gener-
ally ran behind the rest of the Democratic party. Key observed that 
religion and voting shifts were less pronounced on the Pacific coast 
than might be expected and that some predominantly Protestant areas 
did not vote uniformly against the Democrats. The detailed election 
10 data suggested the existence of some sectional differentials. North-
western Catholics behaved differently from those of the Far West and 
western non-Catholics responded differently from northeastern counter-
parts. These variations show that aggregate data may not present an 
8 Ibid , p . 2 7 6 • 
9As cited in Austin Ranney, "Les Elections Americaines de 1960 , 11 
Revue francaise de Science Politique, p. 855. 
10v. 0. Key, "Interpreting the Election Results,". in P. T. David, 
The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961, The Brockings 
Tosti tut.ion, (1961) ~ p. 5.--
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accurate picture of the importance of a single variable. Racial, eth-
nic, religious and nationalistic groups are not homogeneous voting 
categories. The effect of local conditions on the outcome of an elec-
tion may have been overlooked. However the religious factor in the 
motivation of the electorate in 1960 may have overpassed other partisan 
social, or regional considerations. 
Ideology, Religion and Voting in France 
Differences in political and religious ideologies are striking in 
France. They stem from the Revolution of 1789 and from the 16th and 
17th century religious wars. Although these wars ended in the triumph 
of the Catholics and the partial elimination of the Protestants, the 
latter still play an important part in politics. Moreover within the 
ranks of French Catholics there are traditional divergences. To some 
extent the present day opposition between liberal Catholics and those 
who support a rigid doctrine of Church supremacy reproduces the di-
visions of previous centuries. 
The differences in political ideologies are even more striking. 
In France no regime has enjoyed unchallenged legitimacy. Each has been 
threatened by reactionaries or radicals or both. Political regimes 
haved followed one another since 1789: monarchy by divine right, 
revolutionary republic, charismatic empire, constitutional monarchy, 
liberal monarchy, presidential republic, plebiscitarian empire, par-
liamentary republic, military occupation, multi-party republic, charis-
matic republic. The roots of political cleavage sometimes go deep 
into the past. As Francois Goguel remarked: "In order to explain 
certain differences having consistently reoccurired · in 'the e'lectoral 
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ll behavior of some cantons or communes, one has to go back to history." 
In contrast to the United States, where parties agree on the 
essentials and especially on the system itself, in France it is the 
system which is questioned by some groups, whose members think that the 
interest of the class which they represent cannot be satisfied by those 
institutions and want other rules and other institutions. The extreme 
right and, the PCF do not accept the notion of a pluralist democracy. 
The roots of ideological cleavages go deep into the past. The 
revolution of 1789 is the starting point for all present day French 
parties because it brought about patterns of conflict between conser-
vatives and liberals. This conflict was social as well as political. 
The 18th century conservatives represented the aristocracy and supported 
the monarchical "ancien regime," a society founded on "natural differ-
ence", in which the nobility had a right to special powers and politi-
cal authority belonged to a hereditary monarch. They regarded political 
power from a paternalist angle. Religion was also an important factor; 
authority was in accordance with divine law. 
The eighteenth century liberals thought the social order ought to 
be founded on reason: the traditional order should be altered and re-
placed by a rational order. All men should enjoy equal rights; none 
had a natural prerogative to rule over others. The liberals were de-
fender of individual liberty, and in particular, of liberty of thought, 
and were suspicious of religion and of the Catholic Church, though 
there were occasional alliances between liberals and Catholics. There 
lLF · G 1 L 1· · d . 1 III R bl' rancois ogue, a po itique es partis ~ ~ ___ epu ique, 
(Paris: Seuil, 1946), p.-"z7. 
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were no socialists at the time of the Revolution of 1789. The birth 
of the socialist movements followed the coming of large scale industry 
and the growth of a proletariat .in the nineteenth century. After the 
Socialist party had gained a mass following, some Catholics turned 
their attention to social problems and started a Christian Democratic 
movement. However, not until 1944 was a major Christian-Democratic 
party born, the MRP. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, one wing 
of the Socialists came out in favor of the Bolsheviks, This produced a 
split in the party and gave birth to the Communist Party in 1920. 
Thus today one can identify several major ideologies: Communism, 
Democratic Socialism, Economic Liberalism, Political Liberalism, Anti-
clericalism, Christian Democracy1 Conservatism .. 
French communism resembles the Russian as far as ideology goes. 
It has adopted Marx's interpretation of history and the classless 
society. Socialism has in common with communism a deterministic con-
ception of history and an ideal of equality among men. It states that 
the existing democratic system has to be extended; that the govern-
ment cannot, in its present form, provide greater freedom and equality, 
and that consequently the government should increa&e its sphere of 
action. The economy of the nation should be regulated by the govern-
ment in such a way that the distribution of goods is on a more equal 
basis and that private property is not a means of oppression. An 
economy controlled by the state, itself controlled by the people, can 
sum up French socialism. 
Economic liberalism posits that the government should refrain 
from interfering with the economic process except to maintain or 
strengthen competition. While entrusting the state with maintaining 
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the rules of the games, economic liberals think that economic decisions 
should be left to the individuals. Political liberalism calls for 
restraint by the state in dealings with the citizens and restricts the 
state to intervention only when public order is menaced. Anticleri-
calism was linked at first to political liberalism. It is a philosophy 
denying the Church any role in secular matters. Christian democracy 
meant to reconcile the principles of liberalism and those of. socialism 
which were consistent with Christian ethics. According to this ide-
ology, the state is subordinate to the individual and man's freedom 
of choice should be preserved as much as possible. From socialism, 
Christian democracy took the concept of the state's responsibility for 
the welfare of society as a whole and the obligation of the govern-
ment to intervene in order to create a society from which man could 
benefit more equally. It added that the major objective of the state 
was to create a society in which men could live according to Christian 
morals, while refusing the state the right to enforce such morals. 
There are various shades of conservatism in France, of which authori-
tarian conservatism and libertarian conservatism may be considered 
as the boundaries. Conservatism accepts the values of economic liber-
alism, but rejects its equalitarian implications. A government con-
trolled by the multitude is a potential danger to the established 
order and its natural hierarchies. The conservative thinks that there 
is a natural social order. When this social order is not menaced, 
authoritarian and libertarian conservatives are undistinguishable. 
When this order is menaced an authoritarian system of government is 
offered as alternative. 
In France, ideologies and organizations do not regularly coincide. 
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Some of the major ideologies find their incarnation in a single party, 
others in more than one. The communist ideology finds its embodiment 
in the PCF; the social democratic in the Socialist Party, the Christian 
democratic in the MR.P; economic liberalism is represented by the Inde-
pendents, the Radicals and the UNR; political liberalism by the Radi-
cals; anticlericalism, by the Socialists, Communists, and Radicals; 
conservatism by the UNR and the Independents. On the Right today one 
finds conservatism and economic liberalism, on the Left, communism, 
democratic socialism, political liberalism and anti-clericalism. 
The link between party and ideology is thus powerful. Under the 
Fifth Republic De Gaulle and the UNR fall directly in the tradition of 
the conservatist Right, although Gaullism presents itself as an ide-
ology promoting unity and challenges traditional divisions and, above 
all, Right- Left distinctions. De Gaulle maintains that these are 
obsolete and claims to take merit wherever he finds it and to borrow 
indifferently from Left and Right. However, he has kept the essence 
of the right wing tradition, the alliance of democracy and nationalism. 
Gaullism incarnates a certain idea of direct democracy as expressed by 
means of the referendum and achieves that mixture of authority and 
democracy, of appeals to the masses and antiparliamentarism, which is 
characteristic of the authoritarian Right. Political institutions 
have been changed in order to conserve traditional values. In advo-
cating a strong executive Gaullism follows in a tradition which in 
France has been identified with Bonapartism. 
Lecanuet and the Centre Democrate fall under the Christian Demo-
crat in tradition. Mitterand, with the support of the Socialists, 
Radicals, and Communists, represents the left wing current. 
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Tixier- Vignancour speaks for the Extreme Right current. During the 
19&5 presidential election voters who generally voted Communist, 
Socialist or Radical voted for the "candidate of the Left". More than 
seven out of 10 leftist voters indicated a preference for Mitterand 
on the first ballot. The remaining 30 per cent of the leftist voters 
indicated a fairly even preference distribution for De Gaulle, 
Lecanuet, and Tixier- Vignancour. On the preference poll taken prior 
to the second balloting, 85 per cent of the leftist voters indicated 
a preference for Mitterand. Voters who indicated a preference for 
the two Gaullist parties (UNR-UDT) preferred De Gaulle by 90 per cent, 
while Independent Republicans expressed 95 per cent support for 
De Gaulle. Among MRP voters about one half supported Lecanuet on the 
first consultation, with the remainder divided among De Gaulle, 
TiKier- Vignancour and Marcilhacy. On the second ballot, 70 per cent 
of MRP voters preferred De Gaulle and only 30 per cent went for 
Mitterand. 
There has always been a deep involvement of the Catholic Church 
in French politics. The Right has, since the middle of the 19th 
century, supported the development of Catholic schools which would 
produce future conservative voters, while the Left has supported public 
secular schools to give a republican and liberal education. Corre-
lation between the voters 1 choice of candidates and religious affili-
ation was significant, proving that in France religion is a powerful 
political ·influence. M. Brule found religion to have had greater in-
fluence 6n French voters than such variables as sex, age~ or occupa-
tional grouping. "In a society where people take pleasure in emphasing 
everything which makes it different from its own past, it is worth 
calling attention to the persistence on the political plane of such a 
12 deep and traditional cleavage." 
TABLE XIX 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
OF DECEMBER 5, 1965 
Claimed to Regularly Occasionally Nonprac-
Have voted on Practicing Practicing t~cing No 
December 5, Catholics Catholics Catholics Religion 
1965, for: (23) (36) (27) (10) 
General 
de Gaulle 55 37 28 14 
Mitter and 7 23 37 56 
Lecanuet 17 11 6 4 
Tixier-
Vignancour 4 3 2 4 
Marcilhacy 1 1 2 1 
Barbu 1 1 
No reply 16 25 24 23 
100 100 Too 100 
Source: Sondages, 1966, no. 2, pp. 15-17. 
In France attachment to Catholicism corresponds to conservative 
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attitudes, while detachment from religious practices accompanies left-
ist voting. In 1965, for example, 68 per cent of the practicing 
.Catholics supported either the MRP or the Independent party, both 
conservative parties. Fifty-six per cent of the nonpracticing and 63 
12 . Michel Brule, "L'appartenance Religieuse et le vote de decembre 
1965", Sondages, (1966), p. 15-17. 
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per cent of the "indifferent11 Catholics supported either the Socialists 
or the Communists. Among members of minority religions, 39 per cent 
supported either the Socialists or the Communists. Among members of 
minority religions, 39 per cent supported the leftist parties and 34 
per cent backed the Radical Party. Among those with no religion 79 
per cent supported the Marxist parties. Conservative secularists, 
anticlericalists or Protestants in France will not vote for a clerical 
conservative party, while religious or practicing Catholics will not 
vote for an anti-religious party. 
CHAPTER V 
GEOGRAPHIC AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES 
Geographic Influences on Voting in the United States 
Regional particularism refers to geographic areas whose, voters ap-
pear to hold certain views or aspirations that are at variance with or 
absent from the views of the nation as a whole. It includes a feeling 
that people of a geographic region possess separate interests, ideals, 
mannerisms, dialects, social traditions, attitudes and values from the 
rest of the nation. 
In the United States during the nineteenth century, the North, the 
South and the Middle West exhibited marked regional characteristics in 
politics. Later, the Far West provided a new regional subculture. The 
particularism of the South has historic roots originating in the colo-
nial era. After the Civil War, race relations and states' rights re-
mained strong political values in the South. 
Originally sectionalism was based on agricultural, connnercial, and 
manufacturing interests. The agricultural interests espoused a policy 
of low tariffs; the commercial interests long supported a policy of 
neutrality and the "open door" in the world; the manufacturing interests 
urged a policy of national protectionism. As various geographic regions 
of the United States developed increasingly diverse interests, a pattern 
of geographic sectionalism developed in politicso After the Civil War, 
the Republican party was the party of the North and the Democrats the 
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party of the South. Today, by dividing America into major regions, it 
is possible to distinguish a recurring pattern of voting behavior. In 
1960, Kennedy received 34,221,463 votes and Nixon 34,108,582 out of the 
68,832,818 votes cast. Kennedy was elected President by 303 electoral 
votes drawn from 23 states, to 219 votes for Nixon, drawn from 26 states. 
Theodore White, analyzing the results of the election, clustered the 
individual states into eight regional groupings and found that the con-
fusion which arises when looking at the results of individual states 
(Table XIX), dissolves into a rough pattern. Of these eight distinct 
geographical communities, Nixon and the Republican party carried five 
and Kennedy, but three of them. 
The most decisive expression of support for Nixon came from the 
block of five predominantly farm states (Iowa, North Dakota, Kansas, 
South Dakota, Nebraska), characterized by the culture of the small town 
and Protestant homesteads of traditional Republican allegiance. Nixon 
led by a margin of 598,362 votes out of a total of 3,395,088. Nixon 
also scored in the eight states of the Rocky Mountains (Montana, Idaho, 
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico), receiving 53.6 
per cent of the vote and leading by 192,313 votes out of 2,641,593 cast. 
The Border States (Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West 
Virginia), provided Nixon with a margin of 263,033 votes out of 
5,837,965 cast, because in these traditionally Democratic, yet funda-
mentalist Protestant regions, religion plays a heavy role. In the in-
dustrial Midwestern States that ring the Great Lakes (Illinois, Mich-
igan, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio), Nixon led by 462,778 out of 
17,607,696 votes cast. This, the industrial heartland of the country, 
remains the greatest single base of Republican strength. The five 
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TABLE XX 
Final Presidential Vote 
STATE TOTAL VOTE REPUB. % DEMO. % OTHER % 
Au:· 564,242 237,981 42.2 318,303 56.4 7,958 1.4 
AI,ASKA 60,762 30,953 50.9 29,809 49.1 
ARIZ. 398,491 221,241 55.5 176,781 44.4 469 0.1 . 
ARK. 428,50:} 184,508 43.1 2i5,049 50.2 ·. 28,952 6.7 
CALIF, 6,507,082 3,259,722 50.1 3,224,099 49.5 23,261 0.4 
COLO. 736,246 402,242 54.6 330,629 44.9 3,375 0.5 
CoNN. 1,222,883 565,813 46.3 657,055 53.7 15 -
.. 
DEL. 196,683 96,373 49.0 99,590 50.6 720 0.4 
FLA. 1,544,180 795,476 51.5 748,700 48.5 4 
GA. 733,349 274,472 37.4 458,638 62.6 239 
HAWATI 184,745 92,41)3 50.0 92,342 50.0 
ID,UIO 300,451 161,597 53.8 138,853 46.2 1 
ILL. 4,757,394 2,368,988 49.8 2,377,846 50.0 10,560 0.2 
IND. 2,135,360 1,175,120 55.0 952,358 44.6 7,882 0.4 
loWA 1,273,820 722,381 56.7 550,565 43.2 874 0.1 
KAN. !:128,825 561,474 60.4 363,213 39.1 4,138 0.5 
KY. 1,124,462 (-02,607 53.6 521,855 46.4 
LA. 80'/,891 230,980 28.6 407,33Y 50.4 169,572 21.0 
ME. . 421,767 240,608 57.0 181,159 43.0 
MD. l,055,349 489,538 46.4 565,808 53.6 3 
MASS. 2,469,,480 976,750 39.6 1,487,174 60.2 5,556 0.2 
·Mien. 3,318,097 1,620;!28 48.8 1,687,269 50.9 10,400 0.3 
MINN. 1,541,887 757,915 49.1 779,933 50.6 4,039 0.3 
Miss. 298,171 73,56_1 24.7 108,362 36.3 116,248 39.0 
··Mo. 1,934,422 962,221 49.7 972,201 50.3. 
MONT; 277,Si9 141,,341 51.1 134,891 48.6 847 0.3 
NEB. 613,095 320,553 62.1 232,542 37.9 
~.rnv. 101,267 c· ... · 'lo~,~ 48.8 <A ON\ 51.2 -.J.t", 1.JUI J-r-,1...1uv 
N.H. 295,761 157,989 53.4 137,772 46.6 
N.J. 2,T73,lll l,3.53,324 49.2 1,385,415 49.9 24,3'/2 0.9 
· N.M. . 311,118 153,733 49.4 156,027 50.2 1,358 0.4 
N.Y. 7,291,()79 3,446,419 47.3 3,830,085 52.5 14,575 0.2 
N.C. 1,368,966 655,648 47.9 713,318 52.1 
N.D. 278,431 154,310 55A 123,963 . 44.5 158 0.1 
Omo 4,H.;l,859 2,217,611 53.:i 1,944,248 46.7 
OKLA. 903,150 533,039 59.0 370,111 41.0 
ORE. 775,462 408,060 52.6 367,402 47.4 
PA. 5,006,541 2,439,956 48.7 2,556,282 51.l 10,303 0.2 
R.I. 405,534 147;502 36.4 258,032 63.6 
s.c. 386,687 183,558 48.8 198,129 51.2 
S.D. 306,087 178,017 58.3 128,070 41.7 
TENN. 1,051,792 556,577 52.9 481,453 45.8 . 13,762 1.3 
TEXAS 2,311,670 1,121,699 48.5 1,167,932 50.5 22,039 1.0 
UTAH 374,981 205,733 54.8 169,248 45.2 100 
VT. 167,324 . 98,131 58.7 69,186 41.3 7 
V.\. 771,449 404,521 52.4 362,327 47.0 4,601 0.6 
WASH. 1,241,572 629,273 50.7 599,298 48.3 13,001 1.0 
W.VA. 837,781 395,995 47.3 441,786 52.7 
Wis. 1,729,082 895,175 51.8 830,805 48.0 3,102 0.2 
WYO. 140,392 77,551 55.0 63,331 45.0 10 
TOTAL 68,832,818 34,108,~82 49.6 34,22lj63 495 502,773 0.7 
Source: White~ p. 43L 
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Pacific States (California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Alaska), pro-
vided Nixon with 50.6 per cent of the votes, or a majority of 107,461 
votes out of 8,733,361. These five geographic regions of the land gave 
Nixon in 1960 a majority of 1,623,967 votes. 
In New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island), the most heavily Catholic section of the country, the 
Democratic party got more support. Kennedy ran up a majority of 
603,587 votes out of 4,977,169 cast of 56.0 per cent. The Old South is 
the prototype of political sectionalism, where race relations and 
state's rights are deep seated political values. Traditionally Demo-
cratic, in 1960 the Old South registered the greatest and most signifi-
cant Republican gains in a national election. However, the ten states 
of the Old South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississipp~ North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia), yielded 
a majority of 530,693 votes out of 8,865,501 cast, or 52.9 per cent for 
the Democratic party. In the Middle Atlantic States (New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania; Maryland, Delaware), Kennedy had 51.5 per cent of 
the votes, or a majority of 601,570 votes out of 16,372,790 cast. 
Kennedy's strategy took into account regional subcultures. He 
campaigned in the North-Eastern industrial states, Johnson in the Old 
South. Kennedy-Johnson carried the popular vote in only three regions--
New England, the South, and the Middle Atlantic States. Some of the 
old sectional presidential preferences were eroded. 
Political attitudes show considerable variation in terms of resi-
dential area. Rural area, central cities, and suburbs contribute dif-
ferently to the voters' political socialization. Suburbs used to be 
Republican and central cities Democratic. However, the 1960 elections 
73 
jolted this tradition, because Kenne4y did well in many suburbs. 1 
There is evidence that persons change their party affiliation when 
they leave the city. As whites move from the central city to the sub-
urbs, their places are taken by Negroes and lower-income whites who are 
Democratic in party preference, which has strengthened the Democratic. 
party in the cities. 
Although cities differ, the influences of urbanization on American 
politics is more definite than that of suburban living; industrialism 
has brought about class politics and its leading issues -- housing, 
civil rights, collective bargaining, wage and hour laws, unemployment, 
welfare measures, consumer production. Beginning with Franklin Roose-
velt, Democratic candidates for President, with the exception of Steven-
son, have carried the largest cities of the United States; majorities 
in the biggest cities are oriented toward the Democratic party. In-
dustrialization and urbanization have fostered a more national outlook, 
while sectionalism, as a force for political cleavage and socjalization, 
has receded into the backgroundo 
Geographic Influences on Voting in France 
In France, political cleavages must be considered within a tra-
ditional region context. Voting is still significantly influenced by 
local traditions. Three regions have remained faithful to their histor-
ic orientations. Western France has remained the stronghold of the 
Right, while southern and central France have remained faithful to the 
Left. 
1William M. Dobrina, Class in Suburbia, New Jersey Prentice Hall, 
Inc., (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), Chapter 2. 
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In the presidential election of 1965, Lecanuet received his 
heaviest support from voters in the North-West, while Tixier-Vignancour 
received his concentrated votes from the South-West and South-East, 
where there were many North African repatriates. The plurality of votes 
fr~m the South, however, went to Mitterand, while in the North-West and 
North-East it went to De Gaulle. 
On the second ballot, the geographical distribution of the votes 
was similar to that of the first ballot. De Gaulle's greatest strength 
was in the North and Mitterand's in the South and Center, which are 
traditionally the strongholds of the Left and Extreme Left, although 
De Gaulle po~led well in some southern areas and Mitterand well in 
northern urban areas, such as the Paris suburbs and Le Havre. 
Siegried observed in 1913 that globally and geographically French 
election results were unchanged. Goguel in 1965 concluded from a geo-
graphical analysis of French elections that the support which French 
voters gave to Mitterand came less from economic and social factors than 
from the persistence of historic traditions, which impels the majority 
of voters in the central, southwestern, and southern regions to vote 
2 for the Left. Historic tradition has remained stronger in the rural 
areas and less populated 11 departments" than in the urban centers. The 
voters who favored Mitterand were faithful to a political style and 
allegiance formed by the end of the nineteenth century. The Left today 
is defined much more in terms of religious values than social economic 
interests and does not imply adherence to a common program. 
2 Francois Goguel, 11L'election Presidentielle Francaise de Decembre 
1965" Review Francaise de Science Politique (18 April 1966), pp. 221-
254. 
TABLE XXI 
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965 
Region: 
Paris Region 
North-West 
North-East 
South-West 
South-East 
Size of Community: 
Rural 
Less than 20,000 
20,000-100,000 
Over 100,000 
Paris Area 
Source: Sandage 1965 
Per Cent 
of De 
December 1-2 
Mitte-
· · Sample · · · Gaulle · · · rand 
19 46 29 
19 42 25 
25 51 24 
15 39 25 
22 31.5 33.5 
35.5 43.5 25 
12 43 26 
14.5 40 32 
24.5 40.5 30 
13.5 48.5 23.5 
Leca-
ri.tiet .· · Others 
15.5 9.5 
27 6.0 
19 6.0 
23 13.0 
16 19.0 
21 10.5 
21 10 
15.5 12.5 
20.5 9.0 
17 11 
December 14-16 
Per Cent 
of 
Sample 
17 
20 
26 
14 
23 
35 
14 
14 
21 
16 
De 
Gaulle 
51 
61 
58.5 
47.5 
52 
57 
53 
47.5 
57.5 
52 
Mitte-
rand 
49 
39 
41.5 
52.5 
48 
43 
47 
52.5 
42.5 
48 
D De Gaulle 1st Mitterand 2nd, lecanuet 3rd 
k / ) De Gaulle 1st, lecanuet 2nd, Mitterand 3rd 
~ De Gaulle 1st, Mitterand 2nd, Tixier-Vignancour 3rd 
• Mitterand 1st, De Gaulle 2nd, L~nuet 3rd 
II Mitterand 1st, De Gaulle 2nd, Tixier-Vignancour 3rd 
Paris Suburbs (Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne) 
r-t--- Paris Suburbs (Seine) 
Paris 
Figure 1 . Distribution of the Candidates' Strength at 
the First Ballo t . Source: Le Monde, 
December 7, 1965 . 
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19 Decembre 1965 
Votes for De Gaulle 
L 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
28.2% of the registered 
voters 
20 to 35.9% 
36 to 41. 9% 
42 to 47.9% 
48 to 53.9% 
54 to 59.9% 
more than 60% 
19 December 1965 
Votes for Mitterrand 
1. De 12 to 17.9% of the 
registered voters 
2. De 18 to 23.9% 
3. De 24 to 29.9% 
4. 30 to 35.9% 
5. De 36 to 41.9% 
6. De 42 to 47.9% 
7. De 48 to 53.9% 
8. 55.4% or more 
• 
Figure 2. Distribution of the Candidates' Strength at the Second 
Ballot. Source: _Le Monde, December. 
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Geographically, De Gaulle was strongest in the regions of the West, East 
and Massif Central; Lecanuet in Normandy, the far West and the Massif 
Central, which were historic strongholds of the old reactionnary and 
clerical right. 
Political and Legal Influences on American Voting Behavior 
Political.and legal.institutions also affect electoral behavior. 
In the United States the Constitution distributes the powers of govern-
ment between the national government and the state governments, Orig-
inally the American system of government left to the states the regula-
tion of suffrage. But the decentralization of political power contrib-
uied to the development of multiple interest groups, which provided an 
alternative method of political participation by the citizenry. 
For parties, interest groups, and governmental institutions mean 
to attract popular participation. Parties are reference groups for the 
voters, whose leaders try .to enlist the electorate to their cause and 
mobilize it for the election. The American presidential election is a 
massive phenomenon. It takes place in three stages. First the dele-
gates of each party in the States meet in convention to designate the 
presidential candidate of the party. The national committees fix the 
time and place of the conventions and allot the number of delegates to 
each state in accordance with the rules established by the preceding 
conventions. In twelve states, there are "presidential primaries" to 
designate the delegates and indicate which candidate for the presidency 
they will support at the convention of the party. It has been said 
that the primary system of nominations represents an effort to enlarge 
the responsibilities of the electorate; yet it may weaken party 
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organizations. In other states the party committees secure the desig-
nation of delegates according to different systems -- generally by 
district committees and state conventions. The delegates who.have been 
thus designated gather later in the national convention of the party. 
Although it takes second place to the excitement over nominations, 
the drafting of the platform is a major function of the convention, a 
widely publicized statement of party faith. Drafting the platform is 
assigned to a committee which convenes a week before the convention to 
hold hearings. Thus, persons from pressure groups are brought into 
contact with the committee and with the party officials. The same 
interest groups appear before both parties. The third function per-
formed by the convention is the nomination of the Vice President. 
In the second stage of presidentiaL elections the American people 
vote by party list in the states for the presidential electors. The 
third phase of the election takes place on the second Monday of December, 
when the presidential electors vote for the President and the Vice 
President. This system has been established progressively. The Con-
stitution provides only that each state shall choose a certain number 
of presidential electors equa.:).. to the number of senators and·represent-
atives that it sends to the Congress. Originally the legislatures of 
the states designated the presidential electors. The Constitution is 
silent concerning the nomination of presidential candidates by party 
convention; neither the states nor the federal government have attempted 
to control it. The organization and control of a national convention 
are the responsibility of the party. The means by which the choice of 
voters is narrowed to two candidates is almost completely controlled by 
the parties. However, the influence of public opinion polls and the 
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presidential primaries operate in the convention to bring about the 
nomination of a.candidate who has strong backing among rank and file 
party members. For instance, in 1960, the candidates for the Democratic 
nomination were closely affected by the results of certain state pri-
maries. Kennedyts strong showing in Wisconsin and West Virginia made 
him the first runner and ended Senator Humphreyts campaign. 
The campaign is a most elaborate affair. It lasts at leas.t nine 
months and motivates millions of Americans into action to support the 
candidates. Among the sixty million voters in 1960, some 4,000,000 
actively participated in the campaign, contributing money, ringing door-
bells, posting stanps, and.· organizing rallies. Lazarsfeld found that 
the chain of events arising from such campaigning is as follows: cam-
paigning increases exposure; exposure then arouses latent predisposi-
tions composed of group or ideological referents; predispositions arouse 
partisan sentiments, and so the emotional basis is laid for participa-
tion. 3 
Political campaigns 11are waged to make marginal changes in politi-
cal alignments. 114 The campaigner has very limited ability to change 
popular attitudes toward parties, candidates, and public policies or to 
alter the scope and efficiency of political organizations. He must 
take as given some of the most important determinants of an election 
outcome and lay his plans accordingly. He must determine whether there 
will be primary dependence upon the party machine or whether the 
3,Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: 
Athenum Publishers, 1961), po 2960 
4
'
11The Presidential Campaign, 11 in Paul T. David, The Presidential 
Election and Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1961), p. 57. 
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formation of "independent connnittees" will be encouraged; whether the 
candidate will depend upon a mass appeal for votes using radio, tele-
vision, and rallies or whether he will bring his campaign to a personal 
level by trying to reach as many voters as possible on a hand-shaking 
basis. In 1960 the television debates between Nixon and Kennedy pro-
vided an innovation in the political use of this medium of mass connnuni-
cation •. The number of people who watched the first debate was close to 
75 million and it has been estimated that 120 million people saw one or 
more of the debates. 
However some writers have found that campaigning has a limited 
value, since most voters have made up th.eir minds before the campaign 
starts. In the study of the 1940 presidential race within a single 
county, it was found that half the voters of Erie County, Ohio, knew in 
May how they would vote in November and never changed their minds; 25 
per cent made up their minds following the national party conventions 
in 1940. Thus only one voter in four had much sensitivity to the ap-
peals of the two candidates during the campaign. But this undecided 
minority would hold the balance of power in any presidential election 
and is important to justify intensive campaigning by both parties. 5 
A similar study of the 1948 presidential election in Elmira, New 
York, found that most voters remained constant during the campaign, 
while 29 per cent wavered between parties or from their normal party 
affiliation. Sixty-four per cent had decided by June; another 15 
5P. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and M. Gaudet, The Peoplets Choice: 
the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: 
Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1944). 
How 
Duell 
82 
per cent came to a final conclusion in August; only 11 per cent in 
October. 6 
The American Voter concludes that 65 to 75 per cent of those who 
vote make up their minds by the end of the national convention and be-
fore the campaign starts; another 10 to 20 per cent between the start of 
the campaign and two weeks before the election. One out of ten remains 
undecided until the last two weeks before the election. 7 Thus it can 
be concluded that the institution of campaigning has only limited sig-
nificance in influencing voters' behavior in American presidential 
elections. 
TABLE XXII 
TIME OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
(VOTERS ONLY) 
Questiori.: How long before the election did you decide that you were 
going to vote the way you did? 
Knew all along 
Before the Conventions, when 
knew canqidates would run 
At the time of the Conventions 
During the Campaign 
In the last two weeks 
Don't remember, not ascertained 
1948 
37 
37 
28 
14 
12 
9 
100 
1952 
30 
4 
20 
10 
4 
100 
1956 
44 
14 
18 
12 
8 
4 
100 
Source: University of Michigan Survey Research Center 
1960 
24 
6 
30 
25 
11 
4 
100 
6B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1964). 
7Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 1960), Chapter 4o 
Political and Legal Influences on French Voting Behavior 
In France, the President is elected for a term of seven years; 
there is no limitation on successive re-election. Qualifications and 
procedures are regulated by statutes, and the conduct of the election 
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is administered by the Constitutional Council, which serves as the pres-
idential election board. Nomination is by petition: each candidate 
is required to have 100 signatures of persons who must be either members 
of Parliament, the national Social and Economic Council, general coun-
cillors of the Departments, or mayors, and these must be residents of 
not less than ten different Departments of France. An absolute majority 
of votes is required to win on the first ballot. If there is not 
m~jority candidate on the first ballot, a second election must take 
place between the two leading candidates, and a plurality is sufficient 
to win. Should either of the two leading candidates ch6ose to withdraw 
from the second ballot, the candidate or candidates next in line would 
be placed on that ballot. 
Since election of the President must take place not less than 20 
days and not more than 35 days prior to the expiration of the term of 
the incumbent, or in the event of the death or removal of the incumbent, 
not less than 20 days nore more than 35 days afterwards, the period of 
the campaign is limited by law to a maximum of three weeks. Although 
in 1965 the political parties did endorse a candidate, party leaders 
took little active part in the campaigning. Party organizations did 
contribute assistance to the candidates by arranging local meetings and 
preparing and mailing out election circulars. The most significant 
medium for the candidates was the national television which the govern-
ment made available to each of the candidates; two hours were provided 
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for use as the candidate preferred. Private television also made its 
facilities available, and a number of "debates" took place between prom-. 
inent backers of several of the candidates. A sampling of voters who 
had viewed :the candidates on television found·that.some 20 per cent 
changed their minds as the result of the television exposure by the can-
didates; most of those who indicated a change of voting intention 
switched to Lecanuet on the first ballot and to Mitterand on the second 
ballot. De Gaulle may be presumed to have suffered some loss of sup-
port in favor of the younger.candidates as a result of the television 
showing. There is no evidence that the personal tours of the candidates, 
the many local meetings and rallies held· by the candidates' supporters, 
the showing of porpaganda films,.and the widespread display of campaign 
posters and circulation of printed publicity had a significant influence 
on the voter.s I decision to support a particular candidate. 
In this first election of the French President by popular vote, it. 
was generally expected that De Gaulle would win a majority on the first 
ballot. Only two of the opposition candidates had strong party back-
ing -- Mitterand, who had the support of the entire Left, and Lecanuet, 
who could expect the support of the moderate Catholic voters. A fourth 
candidate, Tixier-Vignancour, was supported by the anti-Gaullist Ex-
treme Right. Although De Gaulle ran well ahead of his closest rival, 
Mitterand, his total vote fell far short of the required majority, thus 
necessitating a run-off election. Despite the fact that Lecanuet an-
nounced his personal preference for Mitterand, and Tixier-Vignancour 
called upon his supporters to defeat De Gaulle, the incumbent President 
was able to attract almost as many of·. these opposition votes as Mitte-
rand in the run-off election. De Gaulle's percentage of vote increased 
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from 44,645 per cent on the first ballot to 55,20 per cent on the 
second, while that of Mitterand went from 31,722 per cent.to 44,80 per 
cent. Although De Gaulle forfeited most of the Extreme Right vote, he 
attracted nearly two-thirds of the moderate vote of the Catholic Center 
group. 
TABLE XXIIl 
RESULTS OF 1965 FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Registered Voters 
Voting 
Abstentions 
Invalid Ballots 
De Gaulle 
Mitterand 
Lecanuet 
Tixier-Vignancour 
Marcilhacy 
Barbu 
Registered Voters 
Voting 
Abstentions 
Invalid Ballots 
De Gaulle 
Mitterand 
December 5 
28,914,581 
24,502,916 (84,743%) 
4,411,665 (15,257%) 
248,360 (1,013%) 
10,828,521 (44,645%) of expressed votes 
7,694,005 (31,722%) 
3,777,120 (15,572%) 
1,260,208 (5,196%) 
415,017 (1,711%) 
279,685 (1,153%) 
December 19 
28,920,909 
24,378,401 
4,542,508 (15,70%) 
669,747 (2,31%) 
13,085,407 (55,20%) 
10,623,247 (44,80%) 
Source: Anne'e Eolitigue 1965, pp, 106-114. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the relative signifi-
cance of a number of variables in order to discover what motivated 
voters in the United States and France in the American presidential 
election of 1960 and the French presidential election of 1965. A num-
ber of hypotheses were formulated respecting the significance of the 
selected variables. These conclusions will sum up the major findings 
of the research and provide a commentary on the variations between the 
voting behavior of American and French voters. Certain broad general-
izations will be made concerning the implications of voting behavior 
in presidential elections on the party systems of democratic societies. 
The'data and evidences of this research generally supported the 
hypothesis that in the United States most voters support the candidate 
of the 'party with which. they identify. It may also be stated that the 
importance of the presidential election> which is reflected in the 
extremely high incidence of popular participation> has been a strong 
influence on the development and persistence of the two-party system 
in the United States. 
In France> the voters participated for the first time in the 
election of a President in 1965; the upgrading of that office by the 
Constitution .of the Fifth Republic resulted in a record participation 
of voters> which exceeded by more than 10 per cent voting in 
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parliamentary elections. Despite the traditional division of the 
French ele.ctorate into a multi-party system, the voters divided their 
votes on the second run-off ballot in accordance with the basic ideo-
logical division of Left and Right attitudes and values. On the first 
ballot the parties of the Left concentrated their support for only one 
candidate, as was t:J::.ue of the principal parties of the Right; the only 
other candidate of any importance was the leader of the moderate Center, 
whose showing necessitated a run-off election between the candidates of 
the Left and Right. Although there is no evidence yet to support the 
hypothesis that the bipolarization of voters in French presidential 
elections will significantly re-shape the multiparty system into a two-
party system, the results of recent parliamentary elections do show an 
increasing bipolarization of the parties and their elected representa-
tives into Left and Right blocs. The data did show that in France the 
voters deviated from straight party voting patterns to support presi-
dential candidates who corresponded to their basic ideological atti-
tudes and values. 
T.he research on American and French voting behavior· also revealed 
a significant relationship between the political attitudes and values 
of voters and such factors as socio-economic status, ethnic groupings, 
religion, and sectional or geographic traditions •. In both the Uriited 
States and France social status, as determined by occupation and income, 
divides the voters rather sharply: those of lower status tend to be 
Democrats in the United States and to support the candidate of the Left 
in France. As one ascends the ladder of social status in both coun-
tries, the .ratio of support for the conservative candidate increases.:.-
to favor the Republican candidate in the United States and the candidate 
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of the Right in Franceo In the United States, Catholics and members of 
the more fundamentalist protestant churches are predominantely Demo-
crats, whereas in France, it is the non-religious or non-practicing 
Catholics who identify with the Left. Americans who are high-church 
Protestants are generally Republicans, while devout Catholics in France 
prefer the candidate of the Right to that of the Left. A closely re~ 
lated variable is the higher incidence of support by French women for 
the political Right, which corresponds to the higher degree of devout-
ness among French women. Although sectional interests and geographic 
traditions are still evident in the patterns of voting of Americans and 
French, these variables were not decisive in the presidential elections 
of the United States (1960) or France (1965). 
The research indicated that in both the United States and France 
the voters were not significantly influenced by the issues which the 
candidates raised in the campaign. Most of the voters had already de-
cided in favor of a particular candidate on the basis of other factors 
before the campaign took place~ The manner in which the candidates 
chose to raise and deal with issues had only marginal effect on the 
voters. Those who had not already formulated a preference for other 
reasons tended to be voters who do not participate regularly in legis-
lative elections, who have a low incidence of party identification, and 
who are more likely to be influenced by charismatic appeals than issues. 
In both the United States and France the number of voters who.partici-
pate in presidential elections exceeds that of participants in strictly 
legislative elections. 
In both the United States and France candidate appeal to the 
voters was significant. Much of this personal appeal of the candidates 
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was due to their gefferal ideological orientation: Kenndey addressed 
himself to the masses, who had provided such high popular majorities 
for Roosevelt, as the candidate who would continue the social policies 
of the New Deal and Fair Deal. In France, De Gaulle promised to pur~ 
sue the politics of conservatism -- public order, stability of the 
regime, tight fiscal and monetary policy, and international power and 
prestige. The general ideology which the candidates espoused acquired 
appeal also from the personal qualities and style of the candidates. 
Both Kennedy and De Gaulle generated a certain amount of charisma among 
the voters by their attractive personalities, which, in turn, helped to 
spread the appeal of the respective ideologies that they had endorsed. 
The variable which seems to have had major significance in both 
the United States and France in presidential and legislative elections 
has been the institutional nature of the presidency and the method of 
election of the chief executive. Because of the singular importance.of 
the American presidency, the diverse interest groups of American society 
were, at an early historic date, forced to coalesce into broad coali-
tions, which became the basis o'f the American two-party system. Group 
interests in the United States have compelled, because of the extra-
ordinary powers of leadership of the President and the patronage and 
administrative favors which he disposed, to .involve themselves. in the 
politics of electing a President. The norms (statutory and customary) 
by which the Americ~n President is elected required, therefore, the 
merging into two broad party coalitions of the disparate interest groups 
and the voting public. 
In France, multipartism flourished under the parliamentary regime 
because the executive was made up of shifting combinations of party 
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leaders within the legislature who provided representation for various 
interest groups within the collective known as the Cabinet. The leader 
of the Cabinet was the person who could best manage or arbitrate between 
the disparate party groupings who agreed to collaborate in return for 
their fair share of the spoils of power. In this system, the French 
voters delegated their authority to.party representatives and leaders 
to act in their interest; the voters did not,make decisions through 
elections, nor did the parties make any commitments to their electorates 
other than vague testimonials to ideological tenets. Multipartism sat-
isfied the politicians and some interest-groups in France, but not the 
voters. 
The introduction of a strong presidential office elected directly 
by the people in France has required the candidates to establish a 
direct bond of consensus with the electorate. The candidates have 
sought, through various parties and interest groups acting as reference 
groups, to establish a rapport with the electorate. In doing so, how-
ever, the candidates have contributed to the process of re-combining 
heterogeneous and even disparate elements of the public into more ef-
fective voting blocs. A Gaullist bloc of three parties has been welded 
into a compact coalition which has presented a united front against the 
parties of the Center and Left in parliamentary elections. The severe 
defeat of the parties of the Left and Center in recent parliamentary 
elections was due more to their failure to present a united front than 
to their loss of electoral support. Unless they are willing to accept 
a permanent loss of influence, which is unlikely, the parties of the 
Left and Center might be expected to match the Right. 
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